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THE CITY’S SECOND AMENDMENT
Dave Fagundes† & Darrell A. H. Miller‡

Cities are increasingly common sites of contestation over
the scope and meaning of the Second Amendment. Some municipalities have announced their opposition to firearm restrictions by declaring themselves Second Amendment
sanctuaries. Others have sought to curtail gun violence by
passing restrictive local regulations. Still others have responded to police violence by moving to demilitarize, disarm,
or even disband their police forces. The burgeoning post-Heller legal literature, though, has largely overlooked the relationship between cities, collective arms bearing, and the Second
Amendment. In sum, to what extent do cities themselves have
a right to keep and bear arms? This Article tackles that question. The Article contests the proposition that cities are bereft
of constitutional rights in general, or against their states in
particular. The Article challenges this notion by showing that
the constitutional invisibility of municipal corporations is
rooted in an outdated notion of the city as an artificial entity.
The Article then turns to the Second Amendment, questioning
the conventional wisdom that it provides solely a libertarian,
individual bulwark against state restriction. The Article
shows that in fact the right to keep and bear arms has an
important collective dimension that promotes safety, and that
the city is historically and institutionally situated to advance
this Second Amendment feature. Finally, the Article examines
how these two insights operate in practice, first by outlining
the substantive contours of the city’s Second Amendment, and
then by applying the model to contemporary controversies in
firearm regulation such as guns in schools, concealed carry,
Second Amendment sanctuaries, and the federal Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act. In addition to advancing the
novel claim that cities themselves may assert rights to keep
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and bear arms, the Article also adds to the growing literature
on municipal constitutional rights and the institutional framing
of the Second Amendment in a post-Heller world.
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INTRODUCTION
Second Amendment cases and commentary alike focus almost exclusively on individual arms bearing. Yet in an increasing number of contemporary contexts, local governments have
used legislation and policy statements to assert their own, independent interest in the right to keep and bear arms. In New
Hampshire, after the governor vetoed a statewide gun-free
school bill, one local district banned all firearm possession in
school buildings and on buses by anyone other than the police.1 In Seattle, Washington, city police officers sued the city,
claiming it had infringed upon their Second Amendment rights
to keep and bear (government-issued) arms by entering into a
1
Rick Ganley & Mary McIntyre, N.H. School District Bans Guns from Buildings and Buses, NHPR (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.nhpr.org/post/nh-schooldistrict-bans-guns-buildings-and-buses#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/W54V7RN2].
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consent decree governing use of force.2 And amidst the racial
reckoning sweeping America after the killing of George Floyd,
some cities have considered (or reconsidered) demilitarizing,
disarming, or disbanding their police.3
The implications of a city’s right to keep and bear arms do
not always fall on the side of gun regulation. Local governments, especially smaller towns and rural counties in blue
states, may want to be more gun-friendly despite state restrictions. Some school districts have sought to arm their teachers.4 Some localities have declared themselves “Second
Amendment sanctuaries” and passed resolutions vowing to resist state laws they think curb gun rights.5 Some local govern2

Mahoney v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 873, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2017).
See, e.g., Amy Forliti & Steve Karnowski, Minneapolis City Council Unanimously Approves Proposal to Disband Police, TIME (June 26, 2020, 12:02 PM)
https://time.com/5860172/minneapolis-city-council-eliminate-police-georgefloyd/ [https://perma.cc/DUZ4-HE8T] (reporting that the Minneapolis City
Council voted to allow dismantling of police force); see also Mélissa Godin, What
the U.S. Can Learn from Countries Where Cops Don’t Carry Guns, TIME (June 19,
2020, 6:18 AM), https://time.com/5854986/police-reform-defund-unarmedguns/ [https://perma.cc/ QX7Q-39WA] (same); Max Marcilla, Charlottesville City
Council Passes Police Demilitarization Measure, Discusses Other Reforms, NBC 29
(July 20, 2020, 10:38 PM) https://www.nbc29.com/2020/07/20/charlottesvillecity-council-passes-police-demilitarization-measure-discusses-other-reforms/
[https://perma.cc/K47L-Z4PL] (reporting that the Charlottesville City Council
passed a resolution prohibiting the police department from receiving military
weapons or training from the military); Minneapolis Mayoral Candidate Raymond
Dehn Proposes Disarming Police of Guns, FOX 9 (July 25, 2017), http://
www.fox9.com/news/minneapolis-mayoral-candidate-raymond-dehn-proposesdisarming-police-of-guns [https://perma.cc/6VPF-BRD8] (describing a mayoral
candidate’s calls for disarming police). For academic commentary on this point,
see Anthony O’Rourke, Rick Su & Guyora Binder, Disbanding Police Agencies, 121
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
4
See, e.g., Mead Gruver, Wyoming District Allows Armed Staff in Area Cited
by DeVos, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 18, 2018), https://apnews.com/cbdb18dd
45994ad2b8175f47dbc50a32/Wyoming-district-allows-armed-staff-in-areacited-by-DeVos [https://perma.cc/XKK6-C52S] (reporting that the Park County
School District voted to carry concealed guns in schools); Elizabeth Hernandez, At
Least 30 Colorado School Districts and Charter Schools Allow Teachers to Carry
Guns, but No Statewide Training Standards Regulate Them, DENVER POST (July 9,
2018, 5:57 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2018/07/08/colorado-teacherguns-schools-classroom/ [https://perma.cc/LE44-W7R2] (“Based on Colorado
law, school boards could designate teachers and staff as school security officers
permitted to carry a concealed weapon on campus without ensuring training.”);
Jason Thomson, Colorado School District to Equip Security Workers with Semiautomatic Rifles, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/2016/0419/Colorado-school-district-to-equip-security-workers-with-semiautomatic-rifles [https://perma.cc/EA7G-J9TW] (“Teachers in Utah are free to
arm themselves, and during the state’s October break from school, the Utah
Shooting Sports Council offered free concealed weapons classes to 20 teachers.”).
5
See, e.g., John M. Glionna, In Needles, A Sanctuary for Gun Owners—and
‘a Little Jab in the Eyes’ for California, S.F. CHRON. (July 31, 2019, 4:36 PM),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/In-Needles-a-sanctuary-for-gun3
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ments have even toyed with the idea of deputizing private
citizens in their jurisdiction.6
These local gun policies—whether expansive or restrictive—often run afoul of state law. New York state law preempts
local authority to arm teachers.7 Georgia legislation prevents
city police from questioning armed individuals about their gun
licenses.8 More than half of the states require municipalities to
permit individuals to carry firearms within city limits, even
when those individuals have little to no training on how to use
them.9 Still other states prevent cities from banning personal
owners-and-14271396.php [https://perma.cc/L333-9Y8L](stating that Needles,
California declared itself a “Second Amendment Sanctuary City”); Jennifer Mascia, Second Amendment Sanctuaries, Explained, TRACE (Jan 14, 2020), https://
www.thetrace.org/2020/01/second-amendment-sanctuary-movement/ [https:/
/perma.cc/MJ9F-5C4F] (“More than 400 municipalities in 20 states have now
passed resolutions opposing the enforcement of certain gun laws passed by state
or federal lawmakers.”); Kieran Nicholson, City Council in Commerce City Approves Resolution as Second Amendment Sanctuary City, DENVER POST (June 4,
2019, 5:26 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2019/06/04/commerce-city-second-amendment-sanctuary-city/ [https://perma.cc/VW5B-GBR6] (reporting
that the Commerce City Council passed a resolution declaring itself a Second
Amendment sanctuary city); Noah Shepardson, America’s Second Amendment
Sanctuary Movement Is Alive and Well, REASON (Nov. 11, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://
reason.com/2019/11/21/americas-second-amendment-sanctuary-movementis-alive-and-well/ [https://perma.cc/G9WR-6FW7] (“[G]enerally, Second Amendment sanctuaries refuse to dedicate resources to enforcing things like ‘red flag’
laws and bans on certain weapons.”). For a sustained academic discussion of this
topic, see generally Shawn E. Fields, Second Amendment Sanctuaries, 115 NW. U.
L. REV. 437 (2020).
6
See Caleb Stewart, Virginia Sheriff Vows to Deputize Citizens If Gun Laws
Pass, WHSV (Dec. 9, 2019 2:18 PM), https://www.whsv.com/content/news/Virginia-sheriff-vows-to-deputize-citizens-if-gun-laws-pass-565981991.html
[https://perma.cc/66DM-WEQK]; see also Christina Maxouris, A Florida Sheriff
Said He Will Deputize Lawful Gun Owners If Protests Turn Violent, CNN (July 2,
2020, 3:10 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/02/us/florida-sheriff-deputizegun-owners-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/GTJ2-KFSJ] (reporting that a
Florida sheriff said he would deputize lawful gun owners if there were violent
protests in his county).
7
See, e.g., Michael Gold, Teachers Barred from Carrying Guns in New York
Schools, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/31/
nyregion/guns-schools-ban-teachers-ny.html [https://perma.cc/VCX6-J3ZY]
(reporting that New York passed a bill banning school districts from allowing
teachers to carry guns in schools).
8
See GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-11-137(b) (2020) (“A person carrying a weapon
shall not be subject to detention for the sole purpose of investigating whether
such person has a weapons carry license.”).
9
Jennifer Mascia, 26 States Will Let You Carry a Concealed Gun Without
Making Sure You Know How to Shoot One, TRACE (Apr. 17, 2017, 11:37 AM),
https://www.thetrace.org/2016/02/live-fire-training-not-mandatory-concealedcarry-permits/ [https://perma.cc/D92M-N7WS] (“Just 24 states and the District
of Columbia include mandatory range time as part of their permitting process,
while the remaining 26 have no such requirement in place.”).
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firearms in government buildings, council meetings and even
police stations.10
In each of these cases, the state preempts the local government’s interest in its own, or its citizens’ collective, arms bearing. If these municipalities were private corporations, and the
state government had dictated that the corporation arm or disarm its agents, a court would need to address some threshold
questions. Does this corporate entity have constitutional
rights? Does the right to keep and bear arms extend to the
corporate entity?11 What kind of burdens can be placed on
them if so? One of us has explored private corporate arms in a
prior work.12 We now address the issue when the corporation
is not private, but municipal.
The city’s distinct role in setting weapons policy has been a
feature of the law for over seven centuries.13 Still, disputes
over arms bearing within the city are typically assessed along
one dimension, with individual rights on one side of the ledger
and a general police power on the other. Cities often lose these
fights, either because the city’s regulation runs afoul of federal
or state rights to keep and bear arms, or, more often, because
the state preempts the local law. Either way, the city’s interest
in arms bearing is typically considered incidental to its more
general power to protect health and safety. We challenge that
conventional framing and address the city’s interest in its own
10
See Location Restrictions, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/
gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/location-restrictions/#buildings [https://
perma.cc/LJ9C-V73S]; Amy B. Wang, Open-Carry Advocates Walked into a Police
Station with a Loaded Rifle. Officers Were Not Amused., WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2017,
4:21 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/02/
07/open-carry-advocates-walked-into-a-police-station-with-a-loaded-rifle-officers-were-not-amused/ [https://perma.cc/RHC2-JECA].
11
In Second Amendment Arms v. City of Chicago, the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois assumed business corporations have Second
Amendment rights. 135 F. Supp. 3d 743, 761 (N.D. Ill. 2015). Judge Dow wrote,
“Absent any clear or precedential guidance on the issue, the Court is persuaded
by the longstanding line of cases recognizing the rights afforded to corporations in
the First and Fourth Amendment contexts. Based on that ever-growing body of
law, it seems inevitable that the same principles will hold true in the Second
Amendment context.” Id. But see Leo Combat, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 15cv-02323-NYW, 2016 WL 6436653, at *10 (D. Colo. Aug. 29, 2016) (“[A]ny rights
extended to a corporation under the Second Amendment are dependent upon the
entity’s ability to assert individual rights of third-parties on their behalf.”).
12
See generally Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald,
and the Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887 (2011).
13
See 2 Edw. c. 3 § 320 (1328) (Eng.) (giving power to “Mayors and Bailiffs of
Cities and Borough[s]” to stop people from carrying weapons in “Fairs [and] Markets, [or] in the presence of the Justices or other Ministers, [or] . . . elsewhere”);
Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 84–85 (2013).
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arms bearing. More provocatively, we explore how a city can
assert a constitutional right to keep and bear arms.
Beyond its core claim that the city has Second Amendment
rights, this Article contributes to the literature on municipalities and public law in two ways. First, it adds to the scholarship on municipal constitutional rights. Municipalities and
local governments regularly participate in the legal system as
both plaintiffs and defendants, but the law has not yet developed a coherent theory of their legal status. Rather, local governments fade in and out of doctrine depending on the
rhetorical or institutional demands of the particular court in
the particular case. We use the Second Amendment rights of
cities as a launching point to highlight the need for a coherent
common law of municipal legal personality and to outline some
options for what such a doctrine may look like. Second, this
Article contributes to post-District of Columbia v. Heller theorizing about the Second Amendment by discussing the right to
keep and bear arms within an institutional framework. Heller
unsettled the one corporate body—the organized militia—that
had structured the right to keep and bear arms for centuries.
This Article advances a model of the city as a collective governance structure whose purpose is self-protection. This purpose,
in turn, provides institutional context for the city’s right to keep
and bear arms in a post-Heller world.
Part I situates municipalities as rights-bearing entities. We
challenge the conventional wisdom that municipalities can
claim no constitutional rights, and certainly none against their
states, because they are mere “arms” or “agents” of the state.
This artificial entity theory of the city does not reflect the sociological reality of the modern municipal corporation or command consistent treatment in constitutional adjudication.
Part II approaches the question of the city’s right to keep and
bear arms, not from the perspective of the entity, but from the
perspective of the right. It questions the commonly held notion
that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for
self-defense is solely personal. It explores the nature of the
right to keep and bear arms and shows that the right—before
and after Heller—contemplates some kinds of collective behavior. This Part explains why it is necessary to re-frame the Second Amendment’s core value as safety, not self-defense
simpliciter, and relates that purpose to the historical role of the
city as supplier of armed internal security. It conceives the
city’s function—perhaps its primary function—as an institution designed for public safety and collective self-preservation.
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Part III turns to the practical implications of this approach,
examining how modern controversies about firearm regulation
would look if seen through the prism of the city’s Second
Amendment.
I
CITIES AS RIGHTS BEARERS
Courts and commentators alike regularly assert that municipal governments can claim no constitutional rights against
their states, including any rooted in the Second Amendment.
Courts often unreflectively treat municipal corporations as
mere agents of state government, to be created or discarded at
the whim of the legislature, unless the state curbs its own
power through legislation or state constitutional amendment.
Certainly, if cities cannot assert any constitutional protections
against their states, it would render the claim that they can
invoke the right to keep and bear arms a non-starter. In this
Part, we challenge this long-accepted view of cities as constitutional nonpersons. We critique this notion by exploring the
flawed foundations of modern jurisprudence about the constitutional status of the municipal corporation as a rights bearer.
This analysis shows that cities should play a central, rather
than a peripheral, role in constitutional discourse, and invites
further scholarly discussion about the legal personhood of municipal entities.
A. Hunter and Cities as Artificial Entities
The notion that municipalities have no rights against their
states—conventionally called the Hunter doctrine (after the
1907 Supreme Court case Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh14) is a
familiar fixture of American public law. In Hunter, the Court
articulated a doctrine of plenary state power over municipal
corporations: “The State . . . at its pleasure, may modify or
withdraw all . . . powers [from the city], may take without compensation [the city’s] property, hold it itself, or vest it in other
agencies, expand or contract the [city’s] territorial area, unite
the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the
charter and destroy the corporation.”15 And, lest there be any
doubt of the scope of this authority, Hunter decreed that all
these acts could be done without conditions, no matter what
the consequences, and heedless of the protest of the city, or
14
15

207 U.S. 161 (1907).
Id. at 178–79.
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any of its inhabitants.16 When it comes to municipal corporations “the State is supreme” and the federal Constitution is
absent.17
States regularly invoke Hunter to quash any claim a municipal government may have against a state regulation.
Courts tend to cite this principle reflexively, without questioning the doctrine’s descriptive accuracy or its legal justification.
In this subpart, we do just that, and show that the Hunter
doctrine relies on an outdated account of the role cities play in
the scheme of government and the lives of their residents, both
as a sociological matter and as a doctrinal one. Once Hunter’s
legal scaffolding falls away, the plausibility of a rights-bearing
municipal corporation becomes apparent.
The roots of the Hunter doctrine extend down to the Court’s
earliest decisions on corporations. Initially, courts did not distinguish between private and municipal corporations.18 The
law regarded the two as more alike than different, and courts
typically proceeded on the assumption that the same rules of
law governed both.19 That basic notion tended to be extremely
restrictive. This approach, which modern scholars term the
artificial entity theory, posited that all corporations were no
more than creatures of the state, and owed their entire existence to the charters that created them. According to Justice
Marshall in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, a corporation is an “artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. . . . [The corporation]
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very
16

Id. at 179.
Id.
18
HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730–1870, at 185 (1983). The distinction
that concerned courts in the early American republic was between chartered
entities (cities and corporations) and unincorporated ones (towns and counties).
Josh Bendor, Municipal Constitutional Rights: A New Approach, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 389, 399 (2013).
19
See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057,
1095 (1980) (“Since the important English cities were corporations indistinguishable as a legal matter from any other commercial corporation, English law naturally treated the question of the power of cities as being synonymous with that of
the power of corporations.”). That is not to say that courts and scholars were not
aware of the formal differences between different corporations, only that they did
not regard them as having the same implications that they have today. James
Kent, for example, articulated in his early treatise on American law a number of
distinctions between different kinds of corporations: lay and ecclesiastical; eleemosynary and civil; and public and private. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 221–22 (1827).
17
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existence.”20 So conceived, a corporation had no cognizable
legal status, and certainly no rights, other than what its charter explicitly granted.
The artificial entity theory regarded all corporations as
“creatures of sovereign dispensation.”21 States extended the
privilege of a charter only in exchange for some social benefit.
Typically, they required corporations to undertake some public-regarding service or maintain some kind of common resource.22 For chartered cities, the public purpose was plain
enough: the state used the municipality to order its internal
affairs. The artificial entity theory for all corporations, municipal and private, presumed a quid pro quo: Because corporations existed at the pleasure of the state, the state could impose
conditions on, exact demands of, and reserve power from
them.23
The legal status of private and public corporations began to
diverge early in the nineteenth century. In Terrett v. Taylor,24
the Supreme Court affirmed that even though private corporations were artificial entities, states could not divest them of
property “without the consent or default of the corporators.”25
The Court stressed, though, that these same protections did
not extend to municipal corporations. Rather, state legislatures remained free to “change, modify, enlarge or restrain”
such public corporations, so long as they did not interfere with
any individual’s private property.26
In Dartmouth College, the Court went a step further.
Dartmouth College considered whether the Contracts Clause
barred the state of New Hampshire from reorganizing a
chartered corporation, Dartmouth College, and transferring its
property to a newly formed board of trustees.27 The Court upheld the challenge to the state’s action, and central to its holding was its conclusion that the College had been chartered as a
private, not a public institution. The Contracts Clause, the
Court held, restrained state legislatures from impairing “contracts respecting property, under which some individual could
20

Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
Miller, supra note 12, at 916.
22
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 132 (3d ed. 2005).
23
Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 708 (Story, J., concurring) (discussing
ability of the state to reserve corporations’ power to contract through chartering);
see Larry Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. J. 183, 209 (2004).
24
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
25
Id. at 52.
26
Id.
27
Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 628–30.
21

R
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claim a right to something beneficial to himself.”28 However,
the Clause “did not intend to restrain the States in the regulation of their civil institutions, adopted for internal government.”29 The Court did not limit its holding to the Contracts
Clause, though. Rather, it stated that because municipalities
are “employed in the administration of government . . . the
legislature of the State may act according to its own judgment,
unrestrained by any limitation of power imposed by the constitution of the United States.”30
The artificial entity theory in Terrett and Dartmouth College
burdened all corporations but weighed most heavily on municipal ones. Private companies still enjoyed some limited freedom
to organize their own affairs and to have their property constitutionally protected from state interference.31 But municipalities were artificial entities in a purer sense: They were solely
creations of the state that could be limited and reorganized
however the state deemed desirable to suit its ends. For a
century after these cases, local governments raised constitutional challenges to state interference with local control—ranging from taxation to boundary disputes to the elimination of
entire cities—on the grounds that such moves violated variously the Contracts Clause, the Due Process Clause, or the
Takings Clause. Courts invariably rejected these claims, invoking the constraints of the artificial entity theory outlined in
Terrett, Dartmouth College and the like, and effectively making
any state delegation of governance prerogatives revocable.32
By 1868 the principle appeared so entrenched that Chief
Justice John Dillon of the Supreme Court of Iowa in Merriam v.
Moody’s Executors summarized the indisputable “settled law”
of municipal corporations:
[A] municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others: First, those granted in express
words; second, those necessarily implied or necessarily inci28

Id. at 628.
Id. at 629.
30
Id. at 629–30. Justice Bushrod Washington added in concurrence that
because a corporation “is the mere creature of [a] public institution. . . . [it] may be
controlled, and its constitution altered and amended by the government, in such
manner as public interest may require.” Id. at 660–61 (Washington, J.,
concurring).
31
Frug identifies the split between city powerlessness and constitutional protection for private corporations as the result of an ideological choice, not one
driven by any real notion of different capacities between the two. See Frug, supra
note 19, at 1073.
32
See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (compiling
cases).
29
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dent to the powers expressly granted; third, those absolutely
essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation—not simply convenient, but indispensable; fourth, any
fair doubt as to the existence of a power is resolved by the
courts against the corporation—against the existence of the
power.33

Dillon’s Rule, as it came to be called, represented the dominant
view of municipal corporations throughout the latter nineteenth and early twentieth century, and still anchors disputes
about municipal power today.34
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh represents the logical extension
of Terrett, Dartmouth College, and Dillon’s Rule. In Hunter, the
Court considered whether residents of the City of Allegheny
could raise a constitutional challenge to the state’s decision to
merge their municipality with neighboring Pittsburgh.35 Pennsylvania had enacted a plan in which a majority of all votes of
the citizens of both Pittsburgh and Allegheny would determine
whether the cities would consolidate. Unsurprisingly, Allegheny, the smaller municipality, lost the combined vote despite
a majority of its citizens rejecting the consolidation. The residents alleged the merger violated the Contracts Clause and
took their property without due process of law. The Court rejected their claims: “Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for
exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may
be entrusted to them,”36 Justice William Moody wrote for the
majority. With respect to any power a municipality has or any
property it may hold “the State is supreme, and its legislative
body . . . may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the
Constitution of the United States.”37
Hunter represents the Court’s most extensive articulation
of the artificial entity theory of municipal corporations, rooted
in the notion that municipalities exist solely at states’ discretion and for the sole purpose of effectuating state ends. In this
view, municipalities are not sociological or political phenomena
as much as creatures of state administration. The state exists
33

Merriam v. Moody’s Ex’rs, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868).
Dillon reiterated his concept of municipal corporations in an influential
treatise. 1 JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55, at 173 (2d ed.
1873). For a rich historical and theoretical challenge to Dillon’s Rule through the
assembly clause, see generally Nikolas Bowie, The Constitutional Right of SelfGovernment, 130 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
Papers.cfm?abstract_id=3676811 [https://perma.cc/A44F-9FLY].
35
Hunter, 207 U.S. at 177.
36
Id. at 178.
37
Id. at 179.
34
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prior to law, but the city does not.38 Hunter’s framing of the
city in this way then justified the Court’s holding in two ways.
One rationale was a simple greater-includes-the-lesser notion:
If states could create and dissolve local entities at will, then it
would be incoherent to regard those entities as having any
capacity to assert constitutional rights against those states.39
The other was that if the sole purpose of local governments is to
facilitate the work of state governments, allowing municipalities to interpose federal constitutional guarantees would frustrate rather than further their core function.40 Hence, states
were free to do anything they wanted to do to local governments, “conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the
consent of citizens, or even against their protest.”41 Finally, the
Court put an exclamation point on this holding, encouraging
the lower federal courts to apply this rule “wherever . . .
applicable.”42
Hunter established a broad “federal rule of local powerlessness.”43 The artificial entity theory of the municipal corporation it endorses persists today.44 For example, courts have
denied municipal corporations equal protection on Hunter
grounds.45 They have denied privileges and immunities rights
for similar reasons.46 Other courts have denied municipalities
38
Cf. Daniel Weinstock, Cities and Federalism, in 55 NOMOS: FEDERALISM &
SUBSIDIARITY 259, 267 (James. E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014) (discussing
way in which nations are assumed to be prepolitical, while cities are legally
constructed).
39
Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178 (“The number, nature, and duration of the powers
conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall be
exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State.”).
40
Cf. id. at 178 (noting that municipal corporations are “convenient agencies”
for exercising “governmental powers of the State”).
41
Id. at 179.
42
Id. at 178.
43
Kathleen S. Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47
HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 1, 15 (2012).
44
See, e.g., Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) (noting a state
may “may withdraw any part of that [power] which has been delegated”); 2 EUGENE
MCQUILLIN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 4:3 (3d ed.) (“Legislative authority over municipal corporations and their civil, political and governmental powers exists, except as limited by the federal and state constitutions, and
such legislative power is often referred to as plenary, supreme, absolute, complete, or unlimited.”).
45
E.g., Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192, 196 (1923) (“The City cannot
invoke the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment against the State.”); S. Macomb Disposal Auth. v. Twp. of Wash., 790 F.2d 500, 505 (6th Cir. 1986) (“[A]
political subdivision of a state cannot challenge the constitutionality of another
political subdivision’s ordinance on due process and equal protection grounds.”).
46
City of Marshfield v. Towns of Cameron, 127 N.W. 2d 809, 813 (Wis. 1964)
(“It is also well established that municipalities may not invoke privileges and
immunities under the federal constitution in opposition to the will of the state.”).
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First Amendment rights.47 Occasionally the Hunter-like pronouncements have been broad and categorical, asserting a city
is bereft of any federal constitutional right against its state.48
As recently as 2009, the Supreme Court invoked the
Hunter principle as a major premise of its holding in Ysursa v.
Pocatello Education Ass’n.49 In Ysursa, the plaintiffs argued
that Idaho’s ban on payroll deductions for “political activities”
was invalid as applied to local governments because the state
was preventing municipalities and their employees from engaging in constitutionally protected speech. The Court, which had
already held the restriction valid as applied to state governments, rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish local governments, using the same artificial entity reasoning that the
Court did through the 1800s. “Political subdivisions of States,”
it held, are “subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions.”50 And because municipalities are “merely”
subdivisions of the state, “the State may withhold, grant or
withdraw powers and privileges as it sees fit.”51
Courts’ casual invocations of this framework to diminish
municipal corporations stands in marked contrast to their
evolving treatment of private corporations.52 The private corporation underwent massive changes over the course of the
nineteenth century. General incorporation statutes made formation much easier. Mergers and combinations resulted in a
47
In Muir v. Ala. Educ. Television Comm’n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1038 n.12 (Former 5th Cir. 1982) the court stated that “Government expression, being unprotected by the First Amendment, may be subject to legislative limitation which
would be impermissible if sought to be applied to private expression.” But it
hastened to add, “[T]here is nothing to suggest that, absent such limitation,
government is restrained from speaking any more than are the citizens.” Id.
48
See, e.g., Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933) (“A municipal corporation, created by a state for the better ordering of government, has no
privileges or immunities under the federal constitution which it may invoke in
opposition to the will of its creator.”); City of San Juan Capistrano v. Cal. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n, 937 F.3d 1278, 1280 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[W]e have consistently held
that political subdivisions lack standing to challenge state law on constitutional
grounds in federal court.”).
49
555 U.S. 353 (2009).
50
Id. at 362 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964)).
51
Id. at 362 (quoting Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923)).
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, observing that the blanket citation to the
Hunter doctrine ignores that “[r]elationships between state and local governments
are more varied, and the consequences of that variation are more significant, than
the majority’s analysis admits.” Id. at 375 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52
For an entertaining and illuminating discussion, see generally ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS
(2018).
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few large entities dominating disproportionate shares of major
industries, especially railroads.53 And, as the number of corporations in America increased from approximately thirty-five
in the 1790s to 270,000 by the first decade of the 1900s,54 law
responded to the transformation—and omnipresence—of the
private corporation by gradually theorizing about them differently than municipal corporations.
Alternatives to the artificial entity theory—the aggregation
and real entity theories—sought to match the changing social
reality of the corporate form.55 Theorists of private corporations began to conceive of them, not as mere instruments of
state government to better administer some public good, but as
aggregations of individual constitutional rights holders; or, alternatively, as sociological phenomena akin to families or
schools, greater than the sum of their parts.56 This doctrinal
and theoretical dynamism did not materially alter courts’ unreflective conception of municipalities’ legal status, though,
which to this day remains tethered to Hunter.57
B. Against Hunter
Courts repeatedly echo the Hunter principle that cities lack
any rights because they are mere government instruments to
be created, limited, or destroyed as their states see fit. To the
extent the Hunter doctrine rests on an empirical proposition
about cities—that their identity and function in our democracy
is no more distinctive than the state bureau of motor vehicles—
that is easily disproven. The Hunter doctrine also fails to grasp
the nuance in doctrine that has developed with respect to municipal constitutional rights. Notwithstanding Hunter, the constitutional claims of municipal governments, even against their
states, have been respected, albeit sub silentio. Finally, Hunter
cannot be justified normatively, as important constitutional
values and essential aspects of our constitutional culture re53
See, e.g., SUSANNA KIM RIPKEN, CORPORATE PERSONHOOD 26 (2019); Morton J.
Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L.
REV.173, 181, 190 (1985) (discussing “free incorporation”).
54
Richard Sylla, How the American Corporation Evolved Over Two Centuries,
158 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 354, 355 (2014).
55
RIPKEN, supra note 53, at 29, 35.
56
See, e.g., Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV.
253, 257–62 (1911) (discussing conceptions of corporations).
57
Richard C. Schragger, When White Supremacists Invade a City, 104 VA. L.
REV. ONLINE 58, 67 (2018) (“Almost a generation ago, legal scholars Gerald Frug
and Hendrik Hartog described how the municipal corporation lost its corporate
privileges and became an arm of the state, while the private business corporation
attained property and constitutional rights.”).
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quire municipal participation and protection from state interference. It is time to rethink the broad and unconsidered
application of Hunter and recognize that municipalities can
and should be able to assert some constitutional rights.
At the time Dartmouth College was decided, it may have
been plausible to treat the city as nothing more than a state
functionary.58 But in the century after these cases were decided, the role of local government in American political life has
changed. Demographic transformations mean that the nation’s population has become larger and more urban, so that a
greater and ever-increasing proportion of Americans call cities
home and sometimes identify with their city as much or more
than their state.59
Hunter also rested on the premise that local governments
exist solely to serve the ends of the states that created them.
This notion of municipalities as mere instrumentalities of the
state, too, fails to accurately describe the role of the modern
American city, if it ever did. Far from being agents of the state
consigned to merely carrying out ministerial functions, contemporary cities exercise significant autonomy. Some states
have expressly abandoned Dillon’s Rule as a framework for
municipal government power.60 Home rule movements of the
1800s and early 1900s have wrested power away from state

58
Even that though is a hotly contested proposition. See Frug, supra note
19, at 1083 (“The medieval town was not an artificial entity separate from its
inhabitants; it was a group of people seeking protection against outsiders for the
interest of the group as a whole.”); Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the Municipal
Corporation: A Case Study in Legal Change, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 395 (1985)
(“After the Declaration of Independence, the Corporation of the City of New York
lost no time in ensuring that its charter rights, which were originally granted by
the English king, would continue to be protected from intrusions by its new
sovereign.”).
59
Cf. WENDY GRISWOLD, REGIONALISM AND THE READING CLASS 11–17 (2008) (“The
people within a region are seen as having something in common. This common
ground, which is typically geographic, political, and/or economic, gives rise to
shared forms of cultural expression.”); Victoria C. Plaut, Hazel Rose Markus, Jodi
R. Treadway & Alyssa S. Fu, The Cultural Construction of Self and Well-Being: A
Tale of Two Cities, 38 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1644, 1645 (2012)
(“[E]veryday life is organized by local ideas and practices and [this research] suggest[s] that fulfilling the task of becoming an independent individual—and therefore self and well-being—will necessarily take regionally specific forms.”).
60
E.g., Blanchard v. Berrios, 72 N.E.3d 309, 321 n.2 (Ill. 2016) (recognizing
abandonment of Dillon’s rule); State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah
1980) (“The Dillon Rule of strict construction is antithetical to effective and efficient local and state government.”); see also Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part
I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1990) (stating
“[Dillon’s] Rule has been formally abandoned by many states”).
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authorities and reposed it in local subdivisions.61 Today, forty
states have provisions that extend home rule to qualifying local
governments.62 While home rule does not guarantee cities
complete autonomy from their states, it does establish a degree
of self-determination for municipalities that go far beyond
Hunter’s cramped conception of them.63 Even absent home
rule, most municipalities exhibit democratic attributes, popularly selected executives and legislatures, court systems, and
administrative structures.64 Cities hold elections, levy taxes,
provide for the security of residents, and engage in a host of
other activities independently of states. In light of these regular exercises of traditional governmental functions, cities are
today—and to an extent always have been—a major site of selfgovernance.
Neither does Hunter reflect the fact that cities have become
important economic players—rivaling nations in some cases.65
As Richard Schragger has documented, the ten largest metropolitan regions globally account for over one-fifth of the economic activity of the entire world.66 New York, Los Angeles,
Chicago, the District of Columbia, Dallas, and Philadelphia fall
within the top thirty economies worldwide.67 For some densely
populated cities, like Phoenix, Arizona, the city accounts for
seven out of every ten jobs in the state.68
Hunter as a shorthand for the constitutional invisibility of
the city also fails to accurately describe constitutional doctrine.
61
See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2257, 2278
(2003) (noting that states “beg[a]n to enact constitutional and statutory measures
that explicitly identified towns and cities as legally independent entities” around
the end of the nineteenth century).
62
See JON D. RUSSELL & AARON BOSTROM, AM. CITY CTY. EXCH., FEDERALISM,
DILLON RULE AND HOME RULE 6 (2016), https://www.alec.org/app/uploads/2016/
01/2016-ACCE-White-Paper-Dillon-House-Rule-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
XJ7K-QZD2]. Qualifications for home rule vary, as do the mechanics of recognition. See id.
63
See Nestor M. Davidson, Local Constitutions, 99 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming
2020) (manuscript at 33–40), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3461745&download=yes [https://perma.cc/8HDJ-NJQX].
64
See Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564,
569 (2017).
65
Local governments generated over $1.6 billion in revenue in 2012, just
$300 million shy of the amount generated by states in the same period, and spent
just about as much. JEFFREY L. BARNETT, CINDY L. SHECKELLS, SCOTT PETERSON &
ELIZABETH M. TYDINGS, 2012 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS: FINANCE—STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT SUMMARY REPORT 7–8 (2014).
66
RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE 28
(2016).
67
Id. at 28–29.
68
Id. at 28.
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While the principle is often carelessly invoked where courts
seek to downplay municipal autonomy, other cases have limited its reach, as the Court itself has acknowledged.69 Schragger, in noting how courts inconsistently invoke the Hunter rule,
has referred to the numerous departures and qualifications as
a “shadow doctrine” that treats municipalities as possessing at
least some constitutional personality.70
One early manifestation of this shadow doctrine arose in
1960 in a case called Gomillion v. Lightfoot.71 In Gomillion, the
state of Alabama had redrawn the municipal boundaries of the
City of Tuskegee so as to cut the African American population
of the city from 400 to about five without reducing the white
population.72 The state of Alabama resisted a Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendment challenge to its new map on the theory
that Hunter entitled state governments to reorganize cities
without limit. The Court rejected this argument, stressing that
Hunter was not a carte blanche for states to treat cities however
they wanted, and emphasized that states were subject to at
least some constitutional limitations on their control of municipalities.73 Gomillion was perhaps the most transparent statement of constitutional limits on plenary state authority over
local government; but it is not the only one. In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, Philadelphia, along with other municipal
governments and private entities, sued New Jersey and succeeded in preventing it from enforcing a discriminatory waste
management statute in violation of the Commerce Clause.74
69
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978) (applying
Hunter but noting that “the broad statements as to state control over municipal
corporations contained in Hunter have undoubtedly been qualified by the holdings of later cases”).
70
Richard C. Schragger, Reclaiming the Canvassing Board: Bush v. Gore and
the Political Currency of Local Government, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 393, 407–09 (2002)
(describing this “shadow doctrine”).
71
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
72
Id. at 341.
73
Id. at 344–45 (“[T]he Court has never acknowledged that the States have
power to do as they will with municipal corporations regardless of consequences.
Legislative control of municipalities, no less than other state power, lies within the
scope of relevant limitations imposed by the United States Constitution.”). It
bears noting though that the plaintiffs in Gomillion were individual residents of
Tuskegee, not the City of Tuskegee itself. So while that case can be read for the
proposition that “The City of Tuskegee” was simply a party by dint of the aggregate
interests of the African American residents who had been racially excluded from
the redrawn municipal boundaries—a kind of derivative or aggregate claim—it is
still cited as a limitation on the authority of states against the municipality. See
Morris, supra note 43, at 4 n.7.
74
437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978).
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One could argue that Gomillion and City of Philadelphia do
little to undermine Hunter because they demonstrate only that
individual city residents possess constitutional rights, or that a
city may assert constitutional rights against other states, but
not the city’s own state. But other cases undermine that reasoning. In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, the Court
recognized that a city school district could sue the state for an
equal protection violation when the state passed a ballot measure prohibiting the district from implementing a school integration program.75 In Romer v. Evans, the named plaintiffs
included the City of Aspen, the City of Boulder, and the City
and County of Denver.76 These municipalities had passed ordinances protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination,
which were then invalidated by a statewide Colorado ballot
measure.77 The Romer Court affirmed the cities’ claims that
the measure violated their constituents’ constitutional rights.78
In both cases, in keeping with the tacit nature of this “shadow
doctrine,” the Court simply assumed that municipal corporations had the capacity to sue their own state governments on
theories of constitutional rights shared by private corporations
and natural persons.
Sometimes, much as with private corporations or nonprofit associations, it appears the municipal corporation asserts the aggregated rights of its constituents. For example,
according to one commentator, a local school district could
state a claim against its state because it “ha[d] standing . . . to
vindicate the constitutional rights of its students to attend desegregated schools” in addition to “its own constitutional duty
to redress the effects of school system segregation.”79 Some75
458 U.S. 457, 459, 487 (1982). The Court remarked that the school district was “largely coterminous with the city of Seattle.” Id. The lower court had
expressly identified the school district plaintiffs as “lawfully organized and functioning municipal corporation[s].” Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State,
473 F. Supp. 996, 998 (W.D. Wash. 1979).
76
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625 (1996) (“Other plaintiffs (also respondents here) included the three municipalities whose ordinances we have cited and
certain other governmental entities which had acted earlier to protect homosexuals from discrimination but would be prevented by Amendment 2 from continuing
to do so.”); Copy of Complaint Filed in Romer v. Evans, QUEER RESOURCES DIRECTORY http://www.qrd.org/qrd/usa/legal/colorado/Evans-v-Romer.BRIEF
[https://perma.cc/E6SE-2724].
77
Romer, 517 U.S. at 625.
78
Id. at 635–36.
79
1 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 3:8 (2020); see also Exeter-West
Greenwich Reg’l Sch. Dist. v. Pontarelli, 788 F.2d 47, 48, 54 (1st Cir. 1986)
(awarding attorney fees to school district in establishment clause challenge
against state officers).
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thing of this reasoning may be behind Denver and Aspen’s
standing to sue Colorado on behalf of its gay and lesbian citizens in Romer v. Evans. Kathleen Morris’s discussion of San
Francisco’s litigation against California’s ban on same sex marriage follows a similar path.80 The right to marry is obviously
an individual right. San Francisco’s standing to bring suit on
behalf of its citizens seems to derive from the rights of those
citizens who wanted to marry their same sex partners. Without
some referent in its residents’ individual right to marry, the city
would have little ability to assert a violation on its own behalf.81
A variant of this thinking is that municipalities may sue
when the right they vindicate itself contains an aggregate feature. Just as Citizens United stated that private corporations
can engage in political speech, because they aggregate the
speech rights of their shareholders,82 Judge Posner speculated
in Creek v. Village of Westhaven that municipalities may assert
First Amendment speech rights on similar grounds.83 “To the
extent . . . that a municipality is the voice of its residents—is,
indeed, a megaphone amplifying voices that might not otherwise be audible,” he stated, “a curtailment of its right to speak
might be thought a curtailment of the unquestioned First
Amendment rights of those residents.”84
Sometimes, though, courts seem to recognize municipal
constitutional rights that appear reposed in the person of the
city itself or related to its unique function as a municipal government. It was the city’s Commerce Clause injury vindicated
in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.85 In United States v. 50
Acres of Land, the Court held that the city of Duncanville,
Texas, could state a Takings claim in its own right against the
80

Morris, supra note 43, at 10–11.
See id.
82
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010) (“If the First Amendment
has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations
of citizens, for simply engaging in political speech.”); see also id. at 392 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (stating that corporate speech is protected because it is “the speech of
many individual Americans, who have associated in a common cause, giving the
leadership of the party the right to speak on their behalf”).
83
80 F.3d 186, 192 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Nor is it out of the question that a
municipality could have First Amendment rights.”). This speculation was in the
face of fairly consistent holdings that municipalities do not have First Amendment
rights. See id. at 192–93 (compiling cases).
84
Id. at 193. The Tenth Circuit suggested the Hunter principle stands “only
for the limited proposition that a municipality may not bring a constitutional
challenge against its creating state when the constitutional provision that supplies the basis for the complaint was written to protect individual rights, as
opposed to collective or structural rights.” Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer,
161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1998).
85
See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978).
81
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federal government even though the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment refers only to “private property.”86 Municipal corporations can raise Tenth Amendment
claims if commandeered by the federal government to enforce
federal law,87 whether or not the state consents to the commandeering.88 And then there’s the panoply of procedural constitutional rights that cities assert as a matter of course,
without much fuss or reflection, such as Seventh Amendment
rights to trial by jury89 and some aspects of due process.90
For purposes of challenging Hunter, it does not matter
whether the municipality is thought to be a conduit for the
rights of its residents—a kind of aggregate theory of the municipal corporation—or claiming rights of its own—a variety of the
real entity theory. The frequent departures from the Hunter
doctrine suggest that the courts have some role in “limiting
state attempts to interfere with local affairs in certain constitutional contexts,” particularly those where local governments
86
United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 30–31 (1984) (“[I]t is most
reasonable to construe the reference to ‘private property’ in the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment as encompassing the property of state and local governments when it is condemned by the United States.”).
87
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 898, 904, 935 (1997) (involving a suit
against the federal government by a sheriff in Montana); see also City of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 916 F.3d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding the U.S.
Attorney General lacked constitutional authority to impose new immigrationrelated conditions on federal funding for local law enforcement); City of S.F. v.
Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1231–35 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We conclude that, under the
principle of Separation of Powers and in consideration of the Spending Clause,
which vests exclusive power to Congress to impose conditions on federal grants,
the Executive Branch may not refuse to disperse the federal grants in question
without congressional authorization.”).
88
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) (“Where Congress
exceeds its authority relative to the States, therefore, the departure from the
constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials.”); Bd. of
Nat. Res. of Wash. v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 946 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[A]llowing the
Counties to assert the State’s Tenth Amendment claim . . . will serve . . . principles
of federalism if the State had no plans to challenge the Act.”).
89
Bowers v. City of Philadelphia, No. 06–3229, 2008 WL 5234357, at *5 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 12, 2008) (“Nevertheless, the City has a constitutional right under the
Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution to a jury trial.”); Doctor
John’s, Inc. v. City of Sioux City467 F. Supp. 2d 925, 939 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (“The
court will determine ‘constitutionality’ issues that fall within its province, but
consistent with the parties’ Seventh Amendment rights to jury trial, the court has
preserved for jury determination ‘applicability’ and ‘damages’ issues.”).
90
Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 721
F.3d 264, 291 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[B]ecause of the ready availability of preliminary
injunctive relief, there simply is no need to abridge the City’s due process rights in
favor of the Center’s free speech guarantee.”); DiMaggio, LLC. v. City of S.F., 187
F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (finding that City had insufficient contacts with forum to satisfy Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements for
personal jurisdiction).
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are important in “securing federal constitutional norms” not
readily enforceable by court adjudication.91
Nor does it seem principled to maintain that municipal
corporations may assert a host of rights in disputes with private parties, the federal government, and each other, but not
with their own state. Courts assemble the corpus of constitutional doctrine through case-by-case, common law-like decision making. As has happened with private corporations, a
municipality’s assertion of rights in one case anchors its ability
to assert them in another—or demands some justification why
it cannot.92 Too often courts use Hunter and its ilk to avoid
offering any justification at all.93 Perhaps the most compelling
reason to abandon the Hunter rule is what it costs us. Municipal invisibility robs us of the perspective of municipal entities
on the major constitutional issues that affect them. In an era
when urban versus rural is the increasingly dominant cleavage
in American political life,94 and as more of the country’s population trends toward cities,95 local governments represent polities with distinctive perspectives backed by substantial
populaces. Contemporary cities thus promise a rich input to
federal constitutional questions that is, to a large extent, lost
by rendering them constitutionally invisible. Just as states’
separateness from the federal government promises the development of different policies and preferences, so too can cities
serve as loci of constitutional interpretation by advancing dif-

91
David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 568 (1999).
92
See infra subpart I.C; see also Miller, supra note 12, at 915 (“Once a
corporation is deemed a person for one right, reason demands an explanation why
it is not a person for another.”).
93
See State v. City of Birmingham, No. 1180342, 2019 WL 6337424, at *9–10
(Ala. Nov. 27, 2019) (relying on the Hunter principle to deny Birmingham federal
and state speech rights regarding display of a Confederate monument).
94
See, e.g., JONATHAN RODDEN, WHY CITIES LOSE: THE DEEP ROOTS OF THE URBANRURAL POLITICAL DIVIDE 10–12 (2019) (describing urban-rural polarization and its
“especially consequential” effect on American elections); Emily Badger, How the
Rural-Urban Divide Became America’s Political Fault Line, N.Y. TIMES (May 21,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/21/upshot/america-political-divideurban-rural.html [https://perma.cc/RHA4-Y5W7] (“[U]rban]-rural polarization
has become particularly acute in America: particularly entrenched, particularly
hostile, particularly lopsided in its consequences.”).
95
See UNIV. MICH. CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE SYS., U.S. CITIES (2019) http://
css.umich.edu/sites/default/files/US%20Cities_CSS09-06_e2019.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9G6T-ZAYM] (“Approximately 84% of the U.S. population lives in urban
areas, up from 64% in 1950. By 2050, 89% of the U.S. population and 68% of the
world population is projected to live in urban areas.”).
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ferent policy and litigation positions.96 Local governments may
actually serve as more effective laboratories of constitutional
experimentation than states because they are more numerous,
feature a greater variety of perspectives, and have more direct
contact with their residents. Different municipal governments
may object to their state’s gun laws on different theories, crafting subtly different regulatory regimes in each of these
localities.
As David Barron has written, “[C]ities are often the institutions that are most directly responsible for structuring political
struggles over the most contentious of public questions”—
which certainly includes firearm policy—and are “often
uniquely well positioned to give content to the substantive constitutional principles that should inform the consideration of
such public questions.”97 Federal constitutional protection
may be necessary to ensure that local governments can bring
their “special institutional capacities to bear” in these
disputes.98
The loss caused by municipal invisibility is not solely informational. It is also participatory and intermediating. In terms
of participation, Heather Gerken has written how, in those areas where policies have a federal, state, and local character,
municipal governments may want not only exit, they may want
voice as well. As she describes it, federalism and localism are
not just about giving a subdivision of the national government
a chance to legislate in some discrete local “sphere.”99 It’s also
about allowing them to work within “nested governing structures” that operate in a vertical manner much as the separation of powers operates horizontally.100 In that model, the
“checks and balances” of local government “depends not on
separation and independence, but on integration and interdependence.”101 In this model, recognizing the constitutional
dignity of local governments—at least with respect to some
kinds of rights claims—is akin to branches of government

96
See Barron, supra note 91, at 568. See generally Sarah L. Swan, Plaintiff
Cities, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1227, 1232 (2018) (discussing affirmative litigation by
municipalities as a form of institutional validation and “state building”).
97
Barron, supra note 91, at 491.
98
Id.
99
See Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 26–27 (2010).
100
Id. at 25.
101
Id. at 34.
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working out over time, in iterated events, what kinds of powers
each of them have and under what circumstances.102
In this manner, local governments, along with other kinds
of institutions, like churches, universities, and other associations, also perform a vital intermediating role.103 In saying
this, we understand the city’s mediating role in the way Meir
Dan-Cohen wrote about it.104 Municipal governments mediate
in the negative sense—acting as a buffer between national or
state government and the citizen.105 For example, local governments organized resistance to the Alien and Sedition Acts in
the eighteenth century,106 the institution of slavery in the nineteenth,107 state anti-gay legislation in the twentieth,108 and
federal deportation practices in the twenty first.109 To protect
individual dissent “the Constitution goes out of its way to create, and protect, institutions where individuals who may not be
able to act by themselves can come together with others to
associate, organize and have their voices be heard.”110
102
See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice,
Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1,
30–32 (2014) (describing how constitutional meaning can become fixed by historical practice); see also Weinstock, supra note 38, at 264 (“Self-determining groups
are analogous to rights-bearing individuals”).
103
See JACOB T. LEVY, RATIONALISM, PLURALISM & FREEDOM 93 (2015).
104
See Meir Dan-Cohen, Between Selves and Collectives: Toward a Jurisprudence of Identity, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1213, 1213–14 (1994) (identifying the positional and functional role of intermediary institutions).
105
See Weinstock, supra note 38, at 270.
106
See Douglas Bradburn, A Clamor in the Public Mind: Opposition to the Alien
and Sedition Acts, 65 WM. & MARY Q. 565, 566 (2008) (“The Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions, the most visible opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts, have never
been placed in their true context: as part of a broader movement of petitioning and
remonstrance, the concerted effort of numerous local communities not only in
Virginia and Kentucky but also in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Vermont,
and elsewhere.”).
107
See, e.g., H. ROBERT BAKER, THE RESCUE OF JOSHUA GLOVER: A FUGITIVE SLAVE,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 53 (2006) (describing the
collaboration of a local vigilance committees with local officials to prevent a slave
rendition in Boston).
108
See, e.g., Herrera Joined by Los Angeles, Santa Clara Counterparts in Suing
to Invalidate Prop 8, CITY ATT’Y OF S.F. (Nov. 5, 2008), https://www.sfcityattorney.
org/2008/11/05/herrera-joined-by-los-angeles-santa-clara-counterparts-in-suing-to-invalidate-prop-8/ [https://perma.cc/82PV-6WFP] (describing California
cities’ constitutional challenge to Prop 8’s ban on same-sex marriage).
109
See SARAH HERMAN PECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44795, “SANCTUARY” JURISDICTIONS: FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL POLICIES AND RELATED LITIGATION 19–32 (2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R44795.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2HB-E2ER]
(outlining recent litigation about local and state resistance to federal immigration
policy enforcement).
110
Vikram David Amar, Is It Appropriate, Under the Constitution, for State and
Local Governments to Weigh in on the War on Terror and a Possible War with Iraq?,
FINDLAW (Mar. 7, 2003), https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/is-it-
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But municipal governments also mediate in the positive
sense of “creat[ing] habitats within which individuals can flourish.”111 Citizens often find localities the primary situs of government through which they can express their preferences,
and cities provide a form of democracy that is particularly salient because of its proximity to the people. Indeed, Americans
increasingly relocate to cities so that they can find a place
where their preferences are at least respected and perhaps also
more widely shared with others. Hunter saps municipal governments of the tools necessary to efficiently develop the kind
of suite of goods and services that makes meaningful choice
possible.112 Without the fetters of Hunter, cities become free to
respond to these preferences, to produce goods that provide
choice, and better enable self-selection by citizens, who can
more readily sort themselves among different localities than
different states. If Anaheim, California and Reno, Nevada have
similarly gun-friendly laws, a Los Angeles resident who prefers
lighter firearm regulation will find it much easier to relocate to
the former than the latter.113
But we do not think that the authority to participate in a
market is the only way the city intermediates in this positive
sense.114 In participating in this form of community, and in
particular this form of government, the individual comes to
learn how and what it means to be a free citizen in a wellordered society.115 Simply, the flourishing Dan-Cohen identifies requires a physical proximity with others who are also free
to express, deliberate, and act. Hannah Arendt remarked that
this type of freedom—one different from mere liberation—is a
freedom that requires a “politically guaranteed public realm,” a
appropriate-under-the-constitution-for-state-and-local-governments-to-weighin-on-the-war-on-terror-and-a-possible-war-with-iraq.html [https://perma.cc/
B3CB-PBFZ].
111
Meir Dan-Cohen, supra note 104, at 1214.
112
Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1583, 1591 (2010) (“By locating the institutions to produce public goods at the
lowest possible level, the creation of sub-governments reduces the monitoring
problem and thus mitigates agency problems.”).
113
See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416, 417–18 (1956).
114
The market participant model of local government is thoroughly investigated in SCHRAGGER, supra note 66 and accompanying text.
115
See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 512–13 ((J.P. Mayer ed.,
George Lawrence trans., Harper Perennial Modern Classics 2006) (1835) (“By dint
of working for the good of his fellow citizens, he in the end acquires the habit and
taste for serving them.”); cf. Weinstock, supra note 38, at 273 (noting the epistemic advantages of cities where the inhabitants have “direct access to facts about
how to realize desirable public policy ends in the particular spatial contexts that
cities represent”).
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“worldly space to make its appearance.”116 Independent of its
participation in a decentralized market, the city’s value is in its
ability to provide this public, political concept of freedom.117
Both the negative and the positive mediating function of
the city rely on at least some measure of freedom to decide how
and in what way to cooperate with or resist federal and state
policies.118 In the negative mediating sense, a city needs some
measure of autonomy to position itself between the individual
and the state. In the positive sense, it needs to have the power
to produce those kinds of public goods that makes flourishing
possible. The city’s intermediating role in either of these senses
is not possible when the city is routinely eclipsed in our constitutional order by the state. As Tocqueville cautioned, the liberty generated by local government is the most vulnerable to
outside encroachments, and also the most necessary, for local
governments are the true “laboratories of democracy” where
people learn how to use and enjoy freedom.119
C. Toward a Common Law of Municipal Personhood
Status is one of the most important, yet least visible, notions at play in common law legal systems. To say that a
human or an entity has legal status is to say that they have
enforceable rights under a jurisdiction’s law, and that they may
appear before courts and be recognized in efforts to enforce
those rights.120 In the United States, legal status is mediated
by the doctrine of legal personhood. Legal persons are recognized as valid subjects of the law. In most instances, status is
uncontroversial because most litigants are humans, and natural persons may assert any legal right they possess in state or
federal courts. Less obviously, law also extends personhood to
some entities that are not human individuals. Private corporations, for instance, have legal personhood for many (though by
no means all) purposes, even including many constitutional
rights.121 Yet this legal fiction is not a simple equation by
116
Hannah Arendt, Freedom and Politics: A Lecture, 14 CHI. REV. 28, 30
(1960).
117
See SCHRAGGER, supra note 66, at 77.
118
See Gerken, supra note 99, at 34.
119
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 115, at 63 (“Local institutions are to liberty what
primary schools are to science . . . they teach people to appreciate its peaceful
enjoyment and accustom them to make use of it.”).
120
RIPKEN, supra note 53, at 48 (“The legal language of personhood has symbolic, expressive, and constitutive functions . . . .”).
121
See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (“[T]he words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock
companies, as well as individuals . . . .”).
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which law regards non-human entities as equivalent to natural
persons. Much controversy accompanies what constitutional
rights corporations should bear, as the ongoing controversy
over the Supreme Court’s extension of Speech Clause rights to
corporations illustrates.122
The legal status of municipal corporations raises similar
difficult issues. Answering this question is a necessary task
that extends far beyond whether cities can assert Second
Amendment rights. How cities stand before the law affects how
and whether they can sue and be sued and what rights they
may and may not assert. And, as noted above, in our common
law system of adjudication, how the court administers one set
of constitutional rights for municipal corporations becomes
precedential for how it may administer another set. But, as the
foregoing discussion illustrates, courts have an account of the
legal status of municipal corporations that is perhaps even
more fractured than it is for private corporations. Hunter denies municipal corporations legal status completely, holding
that they are, constitutionally at least, invisible nonpersons,
most acutely when bringing claims against their states, but
also more generally. The persistence of Hunter may derive from
the ease with which it erases the question of municipal personhood, allowing courts to avoid grappling with this challenging issue. Yet at the same time, cities are municipal
corporations, and corporations are the archetypal artificial person to which law grants robust (though not unlimited) legal
status.123 Given this, as well as the increasing vitality of the
city in modern life, it has become harder for courts to simply
122
Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 385–93 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (stating that individuals working through corporate form have First
Amendment protection), and Bradley A. Smith, Celebrate the Citizens United Decade, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/celebrate-thecitizens-united-decade-11579553962 [https://perma.cc/UDV9-87C5] (“Citizens
United unleashed rapid political diversification.”), with Citizens United, 558 U.S.
at 426–29 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that corporations would not have been
understood as within scope of First Amendment protections), and Tim Lau, Citizens United Explained, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Dec. 12, 2019), https://
www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/citizens-united-explained
[https://perma.cc/QQ6C-KME4] (“While wealthy donors, corporations, and special interest groups have long had an outsized influence in elections, that sway
has dramatically expanded since the Citizens United decision, with negative repercussions for American democracy and the fight against political corruption.”).
123
See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978)
(discussing the corporate right to political speech); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436
U.S. 307, 325 (1978) (finding a corporate right against warrantless inspections by
workplace safety regulators); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244,
249–51 (1936) (holding that a press corporation is a person entitled to the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
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dismiss municipalities’ legal status. As we have shown in this
Part, cities sue and are sued, and courts permit them to assert
some rights but not others. The practical reality of a robust, if
patchwork, legal status persists alongside Hunter—the
“shadow doctrine” of local government law. As Schragger has
argued, courts leverage the inconsistent doctrine of municipal
corporations’ legal status to make cities “disappear and reappear at will.”124
The need for a coherent law of municipal corporations’ legal status is evident, but also so large an issue it lies beyond
the scope of this paper. Instead, our ambitions are more modest. We seek to supply a rough sketch of ways that courts
might conceptualize the legal status of the city, one which may,
in turn, supply a vocabulary for the larger theoretical question
of the role of the city in our legal order.
One such approach would be to embrace the broadest version of the Hunter doctrine and declare cities mere artificial
entities that have zero legal status. While some courts continue to embrace this approach, we have explained above why
it fails descriptively and normatively.125
Another model would be to regard the city as having legal
status derived from its citizens. The notion that collective entities have legal status as aggregations of their members has
emerged as the leading theory of, for example, corporate legal
personhood.126 This model tracks intuitively from private corporations to local governments. Just as one could conceive of
corporate rights as derived from the rights of its members, so
could one conceive of municipal rights as derived from those of
its residents.
Operationalizing this derivative notion of city status
presents some challenges. One challenge, common to all kinds
of associations, is how to determine whose rights to aggregate.
Even small cities have heterogeneous populations representing
different opinions on policy matters. One approach would be to
treat the opinion of the majority of residents as the aggregate
will of the city. For constitutional tort liability, for instance,
municipalities can be responsible for the customs or practices
of its agents, even if not formally codified as city policy.127
Alternatively, a control group, such as the mayor or city coun124

Richard C. Schragger, supra note 70, at 416.
See supra subpart I.B.
126
See, e.g., RIPKEN, supra note 53, at 29–39; David Millon, Theories of the
Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 223–25 (discussing the aggregation conception).
127
See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978).
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cil, may serve as a proxy for citizens’ preferences. (Municipalities are typically liable for unconstitutional policies enacted by
their political leadership, irrespective of the support of a majority of the city’s constituents.128) And focus on a “control group”
is how law often treats issues of right and culpability for private
corporations.129 Yet both of these possible solutions elide
rather than solve what Abram Chayes has termed the “representation of interest problem.”130 In either case, the city is not
acting as an aggregation of all its members, but rather as an
aggregation of just some of them.
Another problem with aggregating the rights of the city’s
citizens under this model relates to the nature of rights a city
could assert. A proxy approach equates the capacity of local
governments to make rights-based claims with its citizens’ capacity to assert those rights. Of course, not all rights are conducive to this approach. Some kinds of rights may not be
intelligible when considered in the aggregate.131 Some kinds of
rights may aggregate but generate challenges because of the
governmental nature of the municipal corporation.132 Still,
putting these challenges aside, a court could recognize a city’s
ability to claim speech or voting rights (even though a city
cannot speak or vote) to the extent that the city’s residents’
speech or voting rights had been infringed. This would allow
cities to vindicate the derivative rights of some or all of its
constituents; yet it still may fail to capture those kinds of rights
that make sense only in their aggregate sense. For example,
the harm to a congregation in a Free Exercise case (for example, a state selecting the church’s minister) isn’t necessarily
reflected in the aggregation of an individual constitutional indignity; it’s the harm to the congregation as a congregation.133
Since the aggregation model locates rights in entities only to
128

See id. at 694.
See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 706–07 (2014)
(ascribing religious conscience of closely held private corporation to its shareholders and managers); id. at 754 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Workers who sustain the
operations of [for-profit] corporations commonly are not drawn from one religious
community.”); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010) (relying on “corporate democracy” to manage agents in intra-corporate disputes over speech
(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978))).
130
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1310 (1976).
131
See infra Part II.
132
See id.
133
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565
U.S. 171, 188 (2012) (“Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere
employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal governance of the
129
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the extent that they derive from individuals, though, it is not
clear what room this creates for the city to assert rights on its
own behalf that are, in a sense, more than the sum of the rights
of its residents.
As an alternative, law could theorize cities as having legal
status in their own right, independently of their citizens. This
approach would regard the city as more than just the sum of its
residents, and instead consider the city as a distinct entity
capable of asserting legal personhood on its own behalf. This
notion, too, has intuitive appeal. We often think of cities as
possessing identities independent of their residents, rooted in
their geographies, histories, and cultures.134 Just as with
other institutions like churches or social clubs, a city’s identity
transcends its membership at any given moment.135
Yet as with the aggregation theory, how to translate this
notion into a legally functional account presents a harder case.
What thing “is” the city?136 One option would again be to
choose a control group—mayor, city council—to treat as
equivalent to the municipality. Under this approach, though,
the control group would be disengaged from the notion of citizens’ preferences; law would regard it as the city even if it acted
contrary to the will of the citizenry.137 But what substantive
rights would such a control group be able to assert? In some
cases, state action limits a city’s ability to govern its own affairs, such as reallocating its geography or removing discretion
over subject matter, such as education, that is a core subject
matter traditionally dedicated to local control.138 If we theorize
church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs.”).
134
Cf. Mihailis E. Diamantis, Limiting Identity in Criminal Law, 60 B.C. L. Rev.
2011, 2026 (2019) (discussing the psychological challenges of associating a corporation with a single, stable identity).
135
See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Successor Identity, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 31
(2019) (“Corporations, with their generally hierarchical structure and goal-directed operation, are archetypical entitive groups. As a result, people perceive
corporations as being capable of intentional action and as deserving punishment
when they act badly.”); see also Donald T. Campbell, Common Fate, Similarity,
and Other Indices of the Status of Aggregates of Persons as Social Entities, 3
BEHAV. SCI. 14, 17–18 & n.2 (1958) (defining “entitativity” and describing the
characteristics that make “discrete elements” more likely to be “perceived as parts
of a whole organization”).
136
Cf. Weinstock, supra note 38, at 267 (observing that there is a “folk usage
of the term ‘city’ . . . at odds with legal positivism about cities”).
137
Cf. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978) (holding
that municipalities are liable for the official policies of their leaders).
138
E.g., City of New York v. State, 655 N.E.2d 649, 651 (N.Y. 1995) (holding
that New York City did not have standing to sue the state of New York when the
state limited the city’s management of its own education system).
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the city’s legal personhood as inhering in the municipality itself, cities could challenge these actions because they represent harms to the city itself—its geography, its scope of
authority, its capacity to effectively govern its constituents.139
By contrast, and unlike the aggregation theory, this approach
would not enable municipal corporations to act on behalf of its
denizens. If the city’s personhood is distinct from and untethered to its residents, absent some notion of third-party standing, this undermines the city’s ability to seek redress for
infringements of those residents’ right to vote or their freedom
to marry that the city as a city does not possess.140
One final option would be to think of a city’s constitutional
rights less in relation to a binary—person or not—and more
according to the kinds of rights municipal corporations are
best situated to advance.141 Such an approach would take into
consideration both the institutional features of the particular
constitutional right as well as the corporate—and governmental—nature of the city. Scholars have advanced this approach
with respect to private corporate rights,142 and it seems promising when considering municipal corporate rights as well.143
These brief outlines of how we might model the city’s personhood do not exhaust all possible options.144 Nor does space
permit elaboration of a common law of municipal legal personality. Rather, we highlight an issue that was immanent
throughout this Part, and that has been an undercurrent of
139
See David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the
Constitution, 115 YALE L.J. 2218, 2223 (2006) (“[C]ities are better viewed as sites
for small-scale political contestation and problem-solving on matters that are
within their capacity to resolve through the exercise of their own policymaking
authority.”).
140
For instance, a private corporation lacks Fifth Amendment self-incrimination rights and cannot advance them on behalf of its human agents. See Wilson v.
United States, 221 U.S. 361, 383–84 (1911).
141
See infra Part II.
142
See, e.g., RIPKEN, supra note 53, at 54 (“An adequate account of the corporation requires us to view the entity broadly, focusing on its varied roles and
multiple purposes.”); Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood,
2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1630 (arguing that “corporate personhood should be
understood as merely recognizing the corporation’s ability to hold rights in order
to protect the people involved”).
143
See Yishai Blank, City Speech, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 365, 383 (2019)
(applying this conception to municipal speech rights); Hannah J. Wiseman, Rethinking Municipal Corporate Rights, 61 B.C. L. REV. 591, 600 (2020) (“[M]unicipal
corporate rights are valuable if granting rights to the municipality would further
the purpose of the right.”).
144
See, e.g., RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 73–187(8th ed. 2016) (providing three models of
local government: “agent of the state”; “autonomous, democratic polity”; and
“quasi-proprietary firm”).
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American local government law for two centuries. Legal status
is a prior issue to any assertion of rights, whether by a natural
person, private corporation, or municipal entity.145 That
courts have not overtly addressed this issue does not mean
that there is no law governing cities’ legal status, only that the
law is fractured and unpredictable. Ultimately, questions of
legal status are inevitable, whether we address them in the
context of a private corporation, or a municipal one.146 The
balance of this Article addresses some mechanisms that can
structure the inquiry when the right is the one to keep and bear
arms, but our observation may be broader, and help begin a
conversation about a more transparent, thorough, and coherent doctrine of municipal personality going forward.
II
THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND THE CITY
Part I of this Article explained why the conventional wisdom of the city as constitutionally powerless is neither descriptively accurate nor normatively desirable. Cities do and should
be able to claim some constitutional rights. However, to say
that a city has some claim to constitutional rights is not to say
that it has or should have the full panoply of rights available to
human beings, or to say that it can exercise federal constitutional rights on the exact same terms as other rights-bearing
entities. For example, it would be incoherent to say that a city
has a right to habeas corpus.147 It could create serious conflicts with other rights to say that a city can freely practice
religion.148 And, though a city may have some derivative claim
to equal protection,149 the full extent of equal protection jurisprudence seems ill-suited to address the kinds of discrimination a city—as a city—may face.150
145

See VISA A.J. KURKI, A THEORY OF LEGAL PERSONHOOD 3–4 (2019).
See Miller, supra note 12, at 927 (“[T]he Court’s modern tendency is to
concentrate on the scope of the constitutional right, rather than on corporate
personality. However, focusing on the right rather than the litigant trends toward
a ‘real entity by default’ theory of the corporation.”).
147
See id. at 955.
148
See Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 576 (1989)
(stating that government “may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any
religion or its exercise”). But cf. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 591–92
(2014) (holding that a municipality does not violate the First Amendment Establishment Clause by having a sectarian prayer to open meetings).
149
See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 487 (1982).
150
Ascribing different rights in different measures to different persons is not
unusual in constitutional law. Children do not enjoy the same types or degree of
constitutional rights as adults; prisoners have different types and degrees of
rights compared to free people; non-citizens do not enjoy the same rights as
146
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The issue of corporate constitutional rights has flummoxed
courts and commentators for decades,151 and the governmental nature of the municipal corporation only heightens the complications.152 But, as an entry point to the problem, Justice
Lewis Powell Jr.’s opinion in First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti153 provides a clue. Bellotti involved a Massachusetts
law that prohibited private corporate expenditures in support
or opposition to public referenda, unless such referenda materially affected “the property, business or assets of the corporation.”154 The Court struck down the regulation as a First
Amendment violation. In doing so, it rejected a blanket application of the artificial entity theory for private corporations:
“Corporate identity has been determinative in several decisions
denying corporations certain constitutional rights.”155 But
states do not have unfettered authority to deny their “creatures” all protections of the Constitution.156 Instead, the Court
reasoned, “[c]ertain ‘purely personal’ guarantees . . . are unavailable to corporations and other organizations because the
‘historic function’ of the particular guarantee has been limited
to the protection of individuals. Whether or not a particular
guarantee is ‘purely personal’ or is unavailable to corporations
for some other reason depends on the nature, history, and
purpose of the particular constitutional provision.”157
Bellotti’s footnote provides some limited guidance on how
to analyze the corporate constitutional rights of any corporate
entity.158 Although some scholars—including one of the precitizens. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (“[E]ven where
there is an invasion of protected freedoms ‘the power of the state to control the
conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults . . . .’”
(second alteration in original) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
170 (1944))).
151
Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a
Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 62 (2005)
(calling constitutional decisions in this area “ad hoc” and “arbitrary”).
152
See generally Bendor, supra note 18, at 390–93 (discussing the difficulty in
applying Hunter).
153
435 U.S. 765 (1978).
154
Id. at 768 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977)).
155
Id. at 779 n.14.
156
Id.
157
Id. (citation omitted). The mirror of this distinction for municipal corporations, at least according to one court, seems to be the idea that political subdivisions of states cannot assert “individual” rights (like speech) but can assert
“structural” or “collective” ones (like the Supremacy Clause). Branson Sch. Dist.
RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1998). As we discuss below, the
right to carry weapons for the purpose of safety has a structural and collective
feature, in addition to the individual component.
158
See Fleck & Assocs., Inc. v. City of Phx., 471 F.3d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir.
2006) (applying Bellotti to company that showed live sex acts); Primera Iglesia
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sent authors—have criticized Bellotti’s utility,159 it still
amounts to the only trans-substantive pronouncement by the
Court on how to analyze constitutional claims by corporations.160 Assuming Bellotti asks the right question, there are
good reasons to think that the history, purpose, and nature of
the Second Amendment is not “purely personal” and, consequently, corporations—and especially municipal corporations—have some claim to a right to keep and bear arms.
If that’s the case, then the next question is whether and to
what extent a municipal corporation should be able to exercise
that right. One way to approach a municipal right to keep and
bear arms is similar to how one of us has approached a municipal right to speak. First, the constitutionally implicated activity must be “central to the identity and purpose of the public
entity” such that allowing another sovereign to override its decision “undermine[s] the reason for allocating institutional discretion” to that entity in the first place.161 Second, the public
entity asserting the right must “have the effect of furthering the
Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cty., 450 F.3d 1295, 1305 (11th
Cir. 2006) (citing Bellotti regarding corporate free exercise). But cf. Leo Combat,
LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 15-cv-02323-NYW, 2016 WL 6436653, at *10 (D.
Colo. Aug. 29, 2016) (“In the absence of any binding authority holding otherwise. . . . [A]ny rights extended to a corporation under the Second Amendment are
dependent upon the entity’s ability to assert individual rights of third-parties on
their behalf.”); Beckwith Elec. Co. v. Sebelius, 960 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1338 (M.D.
Fla. 2013) (stating that the “Supreme Court has never resolved” the extent of
corporate constitutional rights).
159
See Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal
Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L. REV. 793, 798 n.19 (1996) (“There is no obvious means of
determining how a right rises to the level of being ‘purely’ personal, or only qualifying as somewhat personal, short of the Court announcing a test for what constitutes an individual, non-corporate right. That, however, is the very point of
calling a right ‘purely personal.’”); Miller, supra note 12, at 912–13 (criticizing
Bellotti); Michael D. Rivard, Comment, Toward a General Theory of Constitutional
Personhood: A Theory of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1464–65 (1992) (same).
160
In a post Bellotti case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refused
to decide whether Boston “had” First Amendment rights to speak and decided the
case on other grounds. Anderson v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628, 637 (Mass.
1978) (“Even if we were to assume that the appropriation of funds by a municipal
corporation to engage in robust, partisan speech is expression that the First
Amendment was meant to protect, there are demonstrated, compelling interests
of the Commonwealth which justify the ‘restraint’ which the Commonwealth has
placed on the city.”). The majority in Ysursa dismissed Bellotti as a way to address
municipal free speech rights. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 362
(2009). But, to the extent it justified its decision based on a categorical rule of
municipal powerlessness and constitutional invisibility, we think Ysursa is wrong
for all the reasons stated in Part I.
161
David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 1637, 1676–77 (2006).
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values” that particular constitutional right is designed to
advance.162
The following subparts address these issues. Subpart II.A
shows how the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms is not purely personal but retains a collective aspect that
may be exercised in corporate form.163 Then subpart II.B explains how, post-Heller, the municipal corporation both facilitates and constrains the collective aspect of the right to keep
and bear arms. Or, to match the theoretical framework for
municipal speech: the city is an institution that presupposes
some level of decisional autonomy on how to secure safety
through the public use of arms, and exercising that right
through the municipal corporate form advances the goal the
right to keep and bear arms is supposed to achieve.
A. The History, Purpose, and Nature of the Second
Amendment
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution
reads: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.”164 For over two hundred years, the
debate over the Second Amendment—to the extent there was a
debate at all—revolved around whether these words contemplated an “individual” or a “collective” right.165 Or, more accurately, whether the Second Amendment protected a right to
keep and bear arms for personal purposes, or whether it only
protected the right in relationship to the organized militia. For
most of those two centuries, the organized militia supplied the
institutional structure that answered all the key questions of
Second Amendment doctrine: what kinds of weapons were protected,166 where and how they could be carried,167 and what
162

Id. at 1677; see also Wiseman, supra note 143, at 655–56.
Some of the evidence in this section about the purely personal right first
appeared in Guns, Inc. but has been updated with new examples and arguments
and tailored to address the unique issue of municipal rights that Guns, Inc. did
not explore. See generally Miller, supra note 12.
164
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
165
These terms are somewhat inapt. As Justice Stevens noted in Heller, the
right to keep and bear arms could still be “individual” and yet only exercisable
through a collective body, like a militia. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570, 645 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Similarly, there is an “individual”
right for someone to petition, or to assemble, but the right is expressed through
collective activity. See id.
166
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding a short-barreled
shotgun not protected by the Second Amendment).
167
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 267 (1886) (holding that there is no right
to form a private armed parade).

R
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kinds of persons could carry them.168 Not a single federal case
in those two centuries struck down a regulation on Second
Amendment grounds.
The 2008 Supreme Court decision District of Columbia v.
Heller169 upended that understanding. Heller involved a District of Columbia regulation that effectively kept individuals
from keeping functional handguns in their homes for self-defense.170 Dick Heller, a gun-rights advocate and special officer
in the Federal Judicial Center, challenged the District’s regulation on handguns in the home as a violation of his Second
Amendment right. By a five to four majority, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that individuals had a right
to keep and bear arms for personal purposes, including selfdefense.171
Heller emphasized that the “central component” or “core” of
the Second Amendment right is individual self-defense, and
that the right to keep and bear arms did not depend on an
individual being part of an organized militia.172 Although the
Court downplayed the reading of the right as related to community and collective defense, it did not state that the community
or collective aspects of the right are thereby irrelevant. The
right may be for personal purposes, but “simply because the
right is personal does not mean it is purely personal.”173
Neither Heller, nor the text, history, or purpose of the Second
Amendment foreclose some kind of collective understanding of
the right in addition to a personal right.174
First, Heller itself seems to contemplate some residual understanding of the right in a collective sense. Heller denigrates
the institutional functions of the organized militia, but refers
repeatedly that the right to keep and bear arms as facilitating
168

Id.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
170
See id. at 573–76.
171
Id. at 636. The Second Amendment right subsequently was incorporated
to apply to states and localities in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750
(2010).
172
Heller, 554 U.S. at 599–600, 630 (emphasis omitted).
173
See Miller, supra note 12, at 932.
174
Courts have similarly analyzed the First Amendment’s Speech Clause—a
provision often used as a model for understanding the Second Amendment—in
terms of protecting both individual speakers as well as speech itself. See First
Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (“The proper question
therefore is not whether corporations ‘have’ First Amendment rights . . . . Instead,
the question must be whether [the challenged law] abridges expression that the
First Amendment was meant to protect.”).
169
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an “unorganized” or “citizens’” militia.175 This “unorganized”
or “citizens’” militia of private arms-bearers is still subject to
discipline and training,176 although the source of that training
and discipline is no longer as strongly tied to either the plenary
authority of Congress, nor to the leadership of the State.177
Further, the opinion, cryptically, says the right is to secure
against “private” or “public” violence.178
Textually, the right is reposed in the “people.” “Persons” in
the Constitution tends to denote individuals and individual
rights bearers, but “the people” refers to collective agents or
institutional actors.179 The Second Amendment speaks of “the
people” and of a “militia”; and both connote collective or associative behavior, as distinguished from the Fifth Amendment180 right against self-incrimination, for example, which
speaks of a “person” and the singular “himself.”181
Historical sources contemporary to the Amendment’s ratification support some collective use of arms as well. English
monarchs bestowed upon the merchant companies who colonized America power to keep and bear arms to defend the colony.182 Blackstone’s conception of the right to bear arms was
175
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 596 (“Although the militia consists of all able-bodied
men, the federally organized militia may consist of a subset of them.”); id. (the
term “militia” connotes “a body already in existence”); id. at 598 (“[W]hen the ablebodied men of a nation are trained in arms and organized, they are better able to
resist tyranny.”); id. at 600 (“[I]f . . . the organized militia is the sole institutional
beneficiary of the Second Amendment’s guarantee—it does not assure the existence of a ‘citizens’ militia’ as a safeguard against tyranny.”).
176
Id. at 597 (“[T]he adjective ‘well-regulated’ implies nothing more than the
imposition of proper discipline and training.”).
177
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, § 2.
178
Heller, 554 U.S. at 594 (“Thus, the right secured in 1689 . . . was by the
time of the founding understood to be an individual right protecting against both
public and private violence.”).
179
Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV.
26, 127 (2000).
180
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
181
See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 600 (discussing protection of Second Amendment rights for “people’s” or “citizens’” militia, as opposed to organized militia).
182
See THE CHARTER OF NEW ENGLAND (1620), reprinted in 3 FRANCIS NEWTON
THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1835 (1909) [hereinafter COLONIAL CHARTERS]; see
also THE FIRST CHARTER OF VIRGINIA (1606), reprinted in 7 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra
at 3783, 3787 (allowing company to “transport the goods, chattels, armor, munition, and furniture, needful to be used by them, for . . . defense, or otherwise in
respect of the said plantations” (spelling modernized)); Miller, supra note 12, at
934 (“Historically, private collectives and early corporations possessed some ability to keep and bear arms.”).
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“political.”183 Under English common law, a man could gather
persons to defend his house, although if they ventured off the
property on their own initiative they risked being charged with
unlawful assembly or riot.184 Contemporary state constitutional provisions that protected a right to keep and bear arms
often spoke of it as necessary for protection of the self and the
political community.185 For example, the 1780 Constitution of
Massachusetts stated, “The people have a right to keep and to
bear arms for the common defence”;186 the 1796 constitution of
Tennessee used similar phrasing: “[F]reemen of this State have
a right to keep and to bear arms for their common defence.”187
In fact, as discussed in more detail below, community law enforcement was understood as a duty in an era without a professionalized force specifically designated to maintain order.
The purpose of the right is not purely personal either. Selfdefense may be the “central component” of the Second Amendment, but that common law core does not preclude some kind
of collective understanding for the right. First, it bears repeating that self-defense alone is an inadequate operating theory of
the Second Amendment.188 Self-defense is both too broad and
too narrow.189 It is too broad because persons, like the mentally ill and felons, have moral and legal rights to self-defense,
but they have no corresponding right to keep and bear arms, as
Heller itself states.190 If the Second Amendment were co-exten183
Michael Steven Green, The Paradox of Auxiliary Rights: The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 52 DUKE L.J. 113,
166 (2002).
184
Compare 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 516
(John Curwood ed., 8th ed. 1824) (1716) (“[A]n assembly of a man’s friends in his
own house, for the defence of the possession thereof . . . is indulged by law . . . .”),
with Queen v. Soley (1707) 88 Eng. Rep. 935, 937; 11 Mod. 114, 116–17 (“Though
a man may ride with arms, yet he cannot take two with him to defend himself,
even though his life is threatened; for he is in the protection of the law, which is
sufficient for his defence.”).
185
See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 191, 198–99, 205–07, 216 (2006) (compiling and characterizing state constitutional provisions).
186
Id. at 208.
187
Id. at 209.
188
JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A. H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT:
RIGHTS, REGULATION AND THE FUTURE OF Heller152–53 (2018); cf. Calderone v. City of
Chicago, No. 18 C 7866, 2019 WL 4450496, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2019) (“The
Court is unaware of any authority indicating that the Second Amendment is
relevant to the question of under what circumstances violent action is legally
justified as self-defense.”).
189
BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 188, at 152–53.
190
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008) (stating
that prohibitions on firearms in the hands of felons and the mentally ill are
presumptively constitutional).
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sive with self-defense, this exclusion would make no sense.
Self-defense is also too narrow, because self-defense at common law has traditionally been justified only where the violence
was necessary, the harm was imminent, and the force proportional to the threat.191 But the right to keep and bear arms
does not neatly map onto these requirements. One is entitled
to possess a firearm (as distinct from using it) no matter how
remote or innocuous the threat and no matter how disproportionate the force to that threat.192
Self-defense is also inadequate because it’s not scalable.
Self-defense covers individuals, yes, but it also covers groups,
states,193 and nations.194 Further, any one of these entities
can pose a threat to any of the others.195 It cannot be that the
right is completely undifferentiated, either with respect to the
nature of the self-defense claims of these different actors, or to
the arms they can use to advance those claims. It seems implausible that precisely the same rules for self-defense apply
whether we are speaking of an individual or a nation; and it
certainly cannot be that the weapons effective to defend one are
equally suitable for any of the others. Heller says as much,
forbidding the private ownership of “dangerous and unusual
weapons” (like land mines or guided missiles or armor piercing
rounds) despite their undeniable utility for national self-defense, and their arguable utility for private self-defense.196
Even the “central component” of the Second Amendment—
self-defense—is not nearly as personal as conventionally
thought.197 To the extent Heller adopts an English common
191

MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 188, at 152–54. For a discussion of the
relationship between Second Amendment doctrine and self-defense, see generally
Eric Ruben, An Unstable Core: Self-Defense and the Second Amendment, 108
CALIF. L. REV. 63 (2020) (exploring challenges to self-defense as the “core” of the
Second Amendment).
193
Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (stating that no state may “engage in War, unless
actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay”).
194
See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”).
195
See David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century,
1998 BYU L. REV. 1359, 1454 n.358 (“The Framers . . . saw community defense
against a criminal government as simply one end of a continuum that began with
personal defense against a lone criminal . . . .”).
196
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
197
For a further elaboration of this point, see generally Darrell A. H. Miller,
Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and the State, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85 (2017)
(noting how the state has a heavy role in shaping the right to self-defense) [herein192
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law baseline for the core of the right, rather than some transnational or transcendent principle of natural law,198 that baseline
historically has contained a public, collective component. As
the Supreme Court recognized, at English common law, all
homicides for personal purposes were culpable acts. “[O]nly
those homicides committed in the enforcement of justice were
considered justifiable; all others were deemed unlawful and
were punished by death.”199 The one exception was homicide
in self-defense in the home, the so-called “castle doctrine.”200
Homicide in public places, even to save one’s life, was not
considered blameless. As Lord Coke wrote, “[A]lthough a man
kills another in his defence . . . without any intent, yet it is
felony . . . for the great regard which the law has to a man’s
life.”201 Those who killed in self-defense had to petition the
sovereign for a pardon, and even then were subject to civil
actions by the family of the deceased.202 Although pardons
became routine by the time of Henry VIII,203 the distinctions
between the two types of homicide remained in criminal law
treatises well into the nineteenth century,204 and Parliament
did not abolish the formal distinction between excusable homicide in self-defense, and justifiable homicide in furtherance of
law enforcement until 1828.205
In contrast to purely personal self-defense, which only excused a homicide, a justified homicide required that the slayer
after Miller, Self-Defense]. The next three paragraphs rely in part on this prior
research.
198
It is possible, of course, that Justice Scalia in Heller did not adopt a positive common law baseline discernable from history, but instead appealed to timeless principles of natural law. Cf. Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d
124, 136 (D.D.C. 2016) (stating that because the Second Amendment codified a
pre-existing right, the “first step in the historical inquiry is examining the right we
inherited from English and natural law”). But that understanding would run
counter to Justice Scalia’s instincts in other areas of constitutional doctrine. See
ANTONIN SCALIA, SCALIA SPEAKS: REFLECTIONS ON LAW, FAITH, AND LIFE WELL LIVED 248
(Christopher J. Scalia & Edward Whelan eds., 2017) (“Do you really want judges—
fallible judges—going about enforcing their vision of natural law, contrary to the
dictates of democratically enacted positive law? Lord, no.”).
199
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 692 (1975).
200
Semayne’s Case (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195; 5 Co. Rep. 91 a, 91 b.
201
Id.
202
2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 482 (2d ed. 1898).
203
Killing a Thief Act of 1532, 24 Hen. 8, c. 5 (Eng.).
204
See Claire O. Finkelstein, Self-Defense as a Rational Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L.
REV. 621, 637 (1996).
205
See The Offences Against the Person Act of 1828, 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, § 10
(providing that “no punishment or forfeiture shall be incurred by any person who
shall kill another by misfortune, or in his own defence, or in any other manner
without felony” (capitalization modernized)).
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act on behalf of the sovereign, either directly or in the course of
public law enforcement.206 Initially, these justifiable homicides
were very few, and had features closer to the execution of a
death sentence than self-preservation.207 But eventually justifiable homicide expanded at common law to include killing to
prevent forcible felonies including robbery, burglary, and arson, and to prevent the escape of a felon.208 Moreover, these
kinds of enforcement actions were described as a duty incumbent upon all law-abiding citizens.209 Although some eighteenth-century treatise writers recognized that self-preservation
and the duty to enforce the law against felons could serve the
same ends, the convergence was coincidental.210 Not until
1806, in the case of Commonwealth v. Selfridge, did an American court “use the term ‘self defense’ to describe what up until
that point in legal history [had been] characterized as a justifiable prevention of felony.”211
In other words, the history of Anglo-American self-defense
law—the core of the right to keep and bear arms according to
Heller—has traditionally maintained a conceptual distinction
between excusable, but socially suspect homicides on behalf of
the self, and justifiable homicides executed in maintenance of
crime control and public order.212 Malcolm Thorburn has provided a crisp jurisprudential account of this history, stating
that private citizens have such authority “only insofar as they
are performing a public function . . . and accordingly, they are
bound by similar normative constraints when deciding what

206
Rollin M. Perkins, Self-Defense Re-Examined, 1 UCLA L. REV. 133, 142
(1954); Benjamin Levin, Note, A Defensible Defense?: Reexamining Castle Doctrine
Statutes, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 523, 528 (2010) (“The only justifiable homicide . . .
was one committed under the auspices of the state, or at least in clear furtherance
of the state’s interests.”).
207
See generally Bernard Brown, Self-Defence in Homicide: From Strict Liability to Complete Exculpation, 1958 CRIM. L. REV. 583 (tracing the history of selfdefense).
208
Thomas A. Green, The Jury and the English Law of Homicide, 1200-1600,
74 MICH. L. REV. 413, 436–48 (1976); see also Miller, supra note 197, at 92–93
(discussing the distinction between justifiable homicide and excusable homicide).
209
WM. L. CLARK, JR., HAND-BOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 137 (1894) (“It is not only
every person’s right, but it is his legal duty, to prevent a felony, even if he has to go
to the extreme of taking the life of the person attempting to commit it.”).
210
MICHAEL FOSTER, CROWN CASES 274 (2d ed. 1791).
211
Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: II-Honest but Unreasonable
Mistake of Fact in Self Defense, 28 B.C. L. REV. 459, 477 (1987) (footnote omitted).
212
Green, supra note 208, at 436–48; see also Miller, supra note 197, at 85
(discussing the historical development of self-defense as a right in Anglo-American law).
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conduct is justified as public officials would be in the same
situation.”213
Because self-defense simpliciter is doctrinally, functionally, and historically inadequate as the sole organizing principle for the Second Amendment, something more nuanced—like
safety—is required to understand the right.214 That is, the
right to keep and bear arms is a right for people to keep and
carry arms for self-defense in such a manner and under such
circumstances as they contribute to safety.215 This safety goal
has both a personal and public aspect.216 A right to carry a
firearm extends only so far as it contributes to personal safety;
and the right aggregated over groups is justified only to the
extent it advances safety of the public at large.217 Such a
reconceptualization of the right to keep and bear arms would
be more consonant with founding-era notions of individual
rights, as Jud Campbell has documented.218 With the exception of certain kind of truly “inalienable rights”—like freedom of
conscience—natural rights were about producing a common
good.219 Nor is such a reconceptualization of the right around
public goods alien to our administration of other kinds of constitutional rights. Speech is protected most robustly when it
empowers political participation and when it contributes to the
ability of a democratic society to govern itself.220 For this reason, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the First Amendment protects not only speakers, but speech itself, and that
213
Malcolm Thorburn, Justifications, Powers, and Authority, 117 YALE L.J.
1070, 1076 (2008).
214
BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 188, at 154–59.
215
Safety does not have to be the only rationale. The right to keep and bear
arms could also be about autonomy or tyranny prevention. See id. at 159–69.
216
Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What is Gun Control? Direct Burdens,
Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L.
REV. 295, 352–54 (2016) (discussing the safety rationale for the Second
Amendment).
217
As one of us has written elsewhere, the Second Amendment may contemplate something like a “marketplace of violence” regarding the individual use of
violence and threats of violence that leaves everyone better off. BLOCHER & MILLER,
supra note 188, at 155–56. Of course, there’s no reason to think that an unregulated “marketplace of violence” is ideal, or that regulation has no place in preventing or resolving market failures. Id.
218
Jud Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32
CONST. COMMENT. 85, 86 (2017) (explaining that founding-era notions of natural
rights were about “creat[ing] a representative government that best served the
public good”).
219
Id. at 112 (“Founding-Era natural rights were not really ‘rights’ at all, in the
modern sense. They were the philosophical pillars of republican government.”).
220
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010)
(“Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy . . . .”).
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more generally the “Constitution often protects interests
broader than those of the party seeking their vindication.”221
Reconceptualizing the right to keep and bear arms as designed to achieve safety would also address a frequent critique
of American constitutional rights discourse—its excessive focus on individuals and its inattention to expressive or institutional features of rights.222 Rights are often conceived of as
trumps—the rights holder plays this one card and vanquishes
all other utilitarian considerations.223 But as a number of
scholars have observed, trumps are not the only way to conceive of rights, and is an incomplete description of American
constitutional practice.224 Instead, rights are often designed to
counter certain kinds of illegitimate reasons the government
offers for its rules.225 Rights protect individuals so that governments cannot eliminate the kind of public good the right is
supposed to supply. As Richard Pildes says: “An intended and
justifying consequence of rights is that through protecting the
interests of specific plaintiffs, rights also realize the interests of
others, including the construction of a political culture with a
specific kind of character.”226 In the context of arms, the implication is that an individual’s right to bear arms is protected to
the extent it contributes to the public good of security. And the
political culture captured by the right to keep and bear arms is
that it carries with it an attendant set of public responsibilities.227 People authorized by law to carry arms and to threaten,
or even execute, lethal force on others are doing so not only on
their own behalf, but on behalf of the public as well.
221

First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
See generally Jamal Greene, Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28
(2018) (criticizing the Supreme Court for focusing on absolute rights as opposed
to balancing them with institutional concerns).
223
See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184–205 (1977).
224
See generally Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998)
(criticizing rights being framed as trumps and advocating for framing rights as
structural). We take no position on whether Pildes characterizes Dworkin’s account correctly. See generally Jeremy Waldron, Pildes on Dworkin’s Theory of
Rights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 301 (2000) (criticizing Pildes’s characterization of Dworkin’s trumps). Our casual observation is that the “rights as trumps” approach in
practice is not applied with the subtlety that Dworkin may have conceived it.
225
Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1998); see also Darrell A. H. Miller,
Institutions and the Second Amendment, 66 DUKE L.J. 69, 87–91 (2016) (discussing how institutional analysis can inform reasons for firearm rights and
regulation).
226
Pildes, supra note 224, at 731.
227
See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1107, 1116–17 (2011).
222
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If the Second Amendment’s fundamental purpose is safety,
rather than an undifferentiated notion of individual self-preservation, then some kind of collective right to bear arms would
seem to follow. Individuals can certainly defend themselves,
but associations magnify that ability. As one of us has written
elsewhere:
Just as individuals can better exercise their First Amendment rights by associating together, individuals can better
exercise their Second Amendment rights by association. After all, a person shouting from a soapbox is far less effective
at communicating than are ten thousand persons in a
parade. Similarly, a lone gunman is far less able to defend
himself than is an armed gang. Just as the right “peaceably
to assemble” is an individual right that is exercised collectively, one can imagine the Second Amendment right to keep
and bear arms as an individual right that can be exercised
collectively, albeit perhaps, in a more tightly circumscribed
manner.228

Assuming this is the correct framing for the right to keep
and bear arms, one must necessarily modify the libertarian
conception of the right. The right to keep and bear arms is not
an individual trump so much as a way of ensuring the production of a certain kind of public good—safety. Personal activities
with firearms that do not contribute to safety either fall completely outside the scope of the right or are not protected by it;
government regulations on the keeping and bearing of arms
that frustrate that goal are unconstitutional; regulations that
advance this public good are lawful.
To rethink the Second Amendment along these lines is not
to gainsay Heller or its core conclusion that the right is personal. Nor does it require a National Guard to be the sole
institution designated to administer the collective aspects of
this public good. But it does require attention to other kinds of
institutions that, post-Heller, give content and meaning to the
public aspects of the right to keep and bear arms, separate (if
not independently) from individuals. Other constitutional
228
Miller, supra note 12, at 938–39 (footnotes omitted). It is possible that no
collective entity manages the public aspects of the right to keep and bear arms,
and the Second Amendment contemplates a largely unregulated “marketplace of
violence” where the market will effortlessly ensure an optimal distribution of “good
guys with guns” to counter all the “bad guys with guns.” See BLOCHER & MILLER,
supra note 188, at 155–57. But that proposition seems needlessly dystopian and
is not warranted by the existing doctrine, see id., or supported by indisputable
empirical evidence. Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, The Latest Misfires in Support of the “More Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1374
(2003).
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rights, often thought of as being “personal,” are facilitated and
shaped by institutions. Churches, universities, political parties, and schools all empower and constrain the First Amendment.229 Rights in these domains are part of the “working
Constitution” that Karl Llewellyn described as “in good part
utterly extra-Documentary.”230 Rights conceived as working
through institutions dissolves the convenient, but false, division between constitutional rights and constitutional structure231 and alter what often appears a simple binary
question—is there a right or not—into something more descriptively accurate and analytically useful.
In sum, nothing about the text, history, tradition, purpose,
or nature of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms precludes a collective understanding of the right in addition to a personal one. But, since Heller toppled the organized
militia as the collective entity that administers this public or
collective aspect of the right, the next task is to identify the
kinds of collectives that now fill the breach.232
B. The City as a Self-Defense Institution
One institution that constrains and facilitates the collective aspects of bearing arms must be the city. The city, among
other things, is a self-defense institution.233 “[D]efense and
security” have been, according to Matthew Waxman, “[a] driving force behind the evolution and development of cities.”234
Cities as a political body far predate more sophisticated communities like states or nations,235 and a chief motivation for
their creation was safety.
229
See generally PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 107–260 (2013)
(providing examples of First Amendment institutions and discussing how they
interact with the First Amendment); see also Frederick Schauer, Institutions as
Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1747, 1757 (2007) (stating
that “there are numerous areas of constitutional law in which institution-specific
categories of doctrine might usefully play a larger role than they do now”).
230
K. N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15
(1934).
231
Ozan O. Varol, Structural Rights, 105 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1030 (2017).
232
For more on this point, see generally Miller, supra note 225, at 95–106
(analyzing various institutions that facilitate and constrain the Second
Amendment).
233
JOEL KOTKIN, THE CITY: A GLOBAL HISTORY 11 (2005); LEWIS MUMFORD, THE
CITY IN HISTORY 51 (1961).
234
Matthew C. Waxman, Siegecraft and Surrender: The Law and Strategy of
Cities as Targets, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 353, 354 (1999).
235
1 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 5
(1911) (“Compact aggregations of people ante-date the formation of states or general governments.”).
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Neolithic humans constructed knots of dwellings, arranged
in a circle, the better to defend themselves from raiders.236
Eventually, these early communities found natural features—
hills, rivers, cliffs—provided even better protection and what
was a place of refuge in times of crisis became, over time, a
destination for settlement.237 In the medieval age, walled cities
replaced scattered and vulnerable villages.238 In fact, the ability to maintain its own security may have been one qualification for municipal corporate status in England.239 Once these
walls were built, to provide freedom from external threats, the
walls could be used to “maintain freedom within.”240 Walled
towns became the site for markets, for labor specialization,
and, eventually for some measure of democratic participation
and autonomy.241 Adam Smith, in his Wealth of Nations, remarked on how “[t]he inhabitants of cities . . . considered as
single individuals, had no power to defend themselves; but by
entering into a league of mutual defence with their neighbours,
they were capable of making no contemptible resistance.”242
These medieval cities had their own militias and came to enjoy
a certain amount of autonomy and political representation.
Max Weber, who famously described the state as the monopolist of legitimate violence,243 identified the urban community as
a settlement possessing the following features: “(1) a fortification; (2) a market; (3) a court of its own and at least partially
autonomous law; (4) a related form of association; and (5) at
least partial autonomy [administered by elected officials].”244
In England, the King recognized these features in the City
of London from as far back as the Norman Conquest.245 When
William the Conqueror invaded England in 1066, he issued a
charter to the City of London recognizing its ancient privileges
236

See LUDWIG HILBERSEIMER, THE NATURE OF CITIES: ORIGIN, GROWTH, AND DE18 (1955).
237
Id. at 18, 20; see also Waxman, supra note 234, at 358 (“[C]ities provided
defensive infrastructure” going back to the third century).
238
MUMFORD, supra note 233, at 250.
239
Id. at 251.
240
Id.
241
Id. at 251–52.
242
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 355 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1991) (1776).
243
Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in THE VOCATION LECTURES 32, 33 (David
Owen & Tracy B. Strong eds., Rodney Livingstone, trans., 2004) (“[T]he state is the
form of human community that . . . lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate
physical violence. . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
244
Max Weber, The Nature of the City, in CLASSIC ESSAYS ON THE CULTURE OF
CITIES 23, 38 (Richard Sennett ed., 1969).
245
See CHRISTOPHER N.L. BROOKE, LONDON 800–1216: THE SHAPING OF A CITY 29
(1975).
CLINE
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and guaranteeing that all of the city’s “laws and customs be
preserved as they were in King Edward’s day.”246 Among the
customs honored by subsequent sovereigns was the right of the
City to elect its own sheriff, aldermen and related ministers.247
The aldermen of London were entrusted with “assuring that
everyone in his ward had weapons and a horse for the purposes
of defense.”248 These rights and privileges, as well as those of
other cities and towns, were reaffirmed in Magna Carta by King
John in 1215.249
As cities became more populated, internal coordination issues became more complicated. Cities needed security forces
to protect residents from the depredations of outsiders; but
they also needed security to protect residents from their neighbors.250 Before the rise of the professionalized police force
around the nineteenth century, policing was a social obligation, pursued by members of the community. The “King’s
peace” had to be preserved and crimes against the peace were
affronts to the sovereign.251 Maintaining the peace was the
duty of certain ministers but was also enforced by the citizens
themselves. The 1181 Assize of Arms “provided that ‘all
townsmen and all communes of free men’ were to bear certain
kinds of arms—thereby making all citizens soldiers and all cit246

Id.
A species of this persists in the concept of the “freedom of the city” requiring military officials to be granted permission to parade in the city. See David
Baxter, Local Military Honoured in Freedom of the City Ceremony, GLOBAL NEWS
(Sept. 12, 2015, 8:07 PM) https://globalnews.ca/news/2217646/local-militaryhonoured-in-freedom-of-the-city-ceremony/ [https://perma.cc/2Y9B-5GRC].
248
HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 382 (1983).
249
Magna Carta, cl. 13 (1215), reprinted in Magna Carta Translation, BRIT.
LIBR., https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/magna-carta-1215 [https://
perma.cc/74DN-95UG] (last visited Nov. 15, 2020) (“The city of London shall enjoy
all its ancient liberties and free customs, both by land and by water. We also will
and grant that all other cities, boroughs, towns, and ports shall enjoy all their
liberties and free customs.”).
250
Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Order-Maintenance Agenda as Land Use Policy,
24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 131, 132 (2010) (“While protecting inhabitants from invading outsiders is no longer a primary function of cities, local
governments must continue to guarantee their residents’ security by adopting
and enforcing the rules necessary to protect them from deviant insiders.”); see
also Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts: Changing the Experiences and Logics of the Public’s Role in Court-Based ADR, 15 NEV. L.J. 1631, 1637
(2015) (“[A]s cities developed, dispute resolution was one of the basic functions of
government; indeed, some argue the formation of cities in Medieval times
stemmed from the need to deal with conflicts so as to facilitate commerce and
provide a modicum of peace and security.”).
251
Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV.
1181, 1231 (2016).
247
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ies military units.”252 Systems like the hue and cry empowered
the citizens of the town to pursue malefactors and imposed a
corresponding duty along with that power.253 An Ordinance of
1195 ordered “all men to arrest outlaws, robbers, thieves and
the harborers of such.”254 An edict in 1233 created a nightwatch and instructed them to “arrest those who enter[ed the]
vills at night and go about armed.”255 The citizenry were
obliged by law to equip themselves for such public service,
depending on their means, and included such items as a
“Hauberke [a Breastplate] of Iron, a Sword, a Knife, and a
Horse.”256 And, indicated above, distinctions between excusable homicide in self-defense, and justifiable homicide in furtherance of law enforcement provided the legal features that
distinguished purely private violence from public violence.257
Even as a professional class of municipal defenders gradually developed between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,258 this notion of a public duty persisted. In 1780,
speaking on violence during the sectarian Gordon Riots,
London’s principal lawyer described the “hybrid right/obligation”259 to bear arms like this:
It seems, indeed, to be considered, by the ancient laws of this
kingdom, not only a right, but as a duty; for all subjects of the
realm, who are able to bear arms, are bound to be ready, at
all times, to assist the sheriff, and other civil magistrates, in
252

BERMAN, supra note 248, at 360 (footnotes omitted).
David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1195–1200
(1999); see also EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 116 (E. & R. Brooke 1797) (1644) (“[T]he duty of the constable is, to raise
the power of the town, as well in the night as in the day, for the prosecution of the
offender . . . .”) (spelling modernized); Donohue, supra note 251, at 1231 (“All
persons between the ages of fifteen and sixty who heard the hue and cry were
obliged to assist.”).
254
Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541, 547
(1924).
255
Id.
256
Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 164 N.E. 726, 727 (N.Y. 1928) (alteration in
original) (citing POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 202, at 577; 1 W.S. HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 294 (3d. ed. 1922)).
257
See discussion supra notes 201–211 and accompanying text.
258
Ira P. Robbins, Vilifying the Vigilante: A Narrowed Scope of Citizen’s Arrest,
25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 557, 563–64 (2016) (“As population density increased and greater urbanization took hold, the citizen’s arrest doctrine adapted
to place less power in the hands of private citizens and more power in the hands of
professional law enforcement.”).
259
Saul Cornell, Limits on Armed Travel Under Anglo-American Law: Change
and Continuity over the Constitutional Longue Durée, 1688–1868, in A RIGHT TO
BEAR ARMS?: THE CONTESTED ROLE OF HISTORY IN CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ON THE
SECOND AMENDMENT 72, 76 (Jennifer Tucker, Barton C. Hacker & Margaret Vining
eds., 2019).
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the execution of the laws and the preservation of the public
peace.260

This tradition of localized security travelled from the United
Kingdom across the Atlantic. Early towns and cities in America
exercised significant autonomy in policing, typically adopting a
constable and watchman system.261 City leaders designated
these officials to keep the peace, and those officials in turn
enlisted the aid of “onlookers or local residents” to make arrests.262 Tocqueville remarked in the 1830s that on his tour of
America he’d “seen the inhabitants of a county . . . forming
committees with the object of catching the criminal and handing him over to the courts.”263 This is because everyone in the
local community “thinks he has an interest in . . . arresting the
guilty man.”264 In a tort suit in 1923 in New York, where a
policeman instructed a cab driver to pursue a criminal, thenNew York Chief Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote:
The duty goes back to the days of the hue and cry. ‘The main
rule we think to be this,’ say the historians of our early law,
‘that felons ought to be summarily arrested and put in gaol.
All true men ought to take part in this work and are punishable if they neglect it.’265

Increased demands on security generated all the problems
associated with delegating authority for that benefit. Volunteers to maintain security became scarce. Watchmen would
shirk.266 Unscrupulous private policing services—like “thief
catchers”—collected bounties for thwarting crimes they conspired to commit.267 In America, private law enforcement took
on an especially grotesque character. Slave patrols, lynch
mobs, and white supremacist organizations all claimed the
mantle of community protectors and keepers of the peace: persons acting—collectively—to pursue their natural right of self260

Id. (quoting WILLIAM BLIZARD, DESULTORY REFLECTIONS ON POLICE, WITH ESSAYS
MEANS OF PREVENTING CRIMES AND AMENDING CRIMINALS 59–60 (1785)).
261
JONATHAN OBERT, THE SIX-SHOOTER STATE: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE VIOLENCE IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 52 (2018).
262
Id.
263
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 113, at 96.
264
Id. This may have been a rosy-colored view of the role of community law
enforcement at the time. See RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE: HISTORICAL STUDIES IN AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND VIGILANTISM 23 (1975) (discussing how private law enforcement sometimes lead to lawlessness and anarchy).
265
Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 164 N.E. 726, 727 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.
J.) (internal citations omitted).
266
Sklansky, supra note 250, at 1197–98.
267
Id. at 1199.
ON THE
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defense.268 Pinkerton guards, hired as a private militia by plutocrats, violently suppressed labor during the latter years of
the nineteenth century.269
Initially, especially in America, the police did not offer
much more effective or more public minded service.270 Professionalization helped ameliorate some of these issues. The move
to professionalize law enforcement began in London in the early
eighteenth century and picked up speed in the United States a
generation later. Specialization of law enforcement, as well as
training and accountability methods, became hallmarks of a
new model for policing.271 Training in weapons was of particular importance. In 1919, New York City Police Commissioner
Arthur Woods disparaged those jurisdictions that had appointed officers and “turned [them] out on the street . . . armed
with loaded revolvers, and yet with no training in the care or
use of the weapon.”272 The result was that “if an officer took a
shot at anyone on the street, about the only safe individual
within range of his gun was the criminal he was shooting
at.”273
The city’s privileged role in securing safety in the form of
policing has been a flashpoint for federalism and localism disputes for hundreds of years. A driver for home rule protections
for cities, for example, was state legislative attempts to transfer
matters of local authority and concern to state entities. One of
the most notorious acts of state “ripper” legislation (as it was
268
As former Confederate General John B. Gordon testified, the Klan “was
simply this . . . an organization, a brotherhood of the property-holders, the peaceable, law-abiding citizens of the State, for self-protection.” Affairs in Insurrectionary States: Hearing Before the J. Comm. to Inquire into the Condition of Affairs in
the Late Insurrectionary States, 42d Cong. 308 (1871) (statement of John B.
Gordon). It was, he said, “a police organization to keep the peace.” Id. at 309.
Klan defendants argued through counsel that they were simply exercising a natural right to “[b]and . . . together as a defense against any such threats as were
apprehended.” PROCEEDINGS IN THE KU KLUX TRIALS AT COLUMBIA, S.C. IN THE UNITED
STATES CIRCUIT COURT, NOVEMBER TERM, 1871, at 425–26 (Benn Pitman & Louis
Freeland Post eds., 1872); see also Saul Cornell & Justin Florence, The Right To
Bear Arms in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment: Gun Rights or Gun Regulation?, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1043, 1063 (2010) (discussing the Klan’s self-defense argument raised during the South Carolina Ku Klux Klan trials).
269
See Sklansky, supra note 253, at 1213.
270
Samuel Walker, Governing the American Police: Wrestling with the Problems
of Democracy, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 615, 623–24.
271
See generally Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise,
130 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 2003–06 (2017) (overviewing the professionalization of
police).
272
ARTHUR WOODS, POLICEMAN AND PUBLIC 159 (1919), reprinted in 1 HARRY L.
WILSON, GUN POLITICS IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND MODERN DOCUMENTS IN CONTEXT
108–09 (2016).
273
Id.
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called) was New York State’s transfer of authority over municipal law enforcement to state organs.274 The act provoked backlash so intense it led to rioting.275 The history of these home
rule movements has to do with preserving local authority over
what many regarded as a fundamentally local institution—the
police department. Municipal litigation over the scope of home
rule authority has frequently involved questions over who is
authorized to police the community, with the trend toward
viewing “matters of police personnel . . . of basically local
concern.”276
The centrality of public security to local concerns is not
just limited to home rule however. Printz v. United States, for
example, a central case in the anti-commandeering canon, had
to do with the requirement of a local sheriff’s office in Montana
to enforce the Brady Handgun Act.277 The premise of the holding appears to be that “localities may decide whether to allow
. . . participation [in federal law enforcement efforts] based on
their own views of whether those enforcement efforts transgress constitutional norms.”278 One of the most important
cases in civil rights litigation, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
addresses the constitutional limits of federal courts to address
misconduct by local police departments through the exercise of
equity jurisdiction.279
To be sure, the Warren Court revolution in criminal procedure280 and the rise of section 1983 as a federal check on local
police power281 have been significant. These kinds of changes
have altered what was otherwise a wholly local phenomenon.
274
Lyle Kossis, Note, Examining the Conflict Between Municipal Receivership
and Local Autonomy, 98 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1126 (2012).
275
Colin Gordon, Patchwork Metropolis: Fragmented Governance and Urban
Decline in Greater St. Louis, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 51, 57 n.51 (2014).
276
OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 6.4 (5th ed. 2019).
277
521 U.S. 898, 904 (1997).
278
Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism
in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1289 (2004) (emphasis
omitted).
279
461 U.S. 95, 105–07 (1983); see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability,
Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1984) (“Even if Lyons’s standing were upheld, the Court ruled
that principles of comity and deference to state law enforcement agencies would
require dismissal under the doctrine of equitable restraint.”).
280
See generally Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA.
L. REV. 1361 (2004) (outlining the major criminal procedure developments the
Warren Court made).
281
See generally, MICHAEL G. COLLINS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: IN A NUTSHELL
§§ 1–14 (5th ed. 2016) (describing how the Court’s application of section 1983
changed to provide a check on local governments and their agents).
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That said, the police power, as it pertains literally to policing,
has and remains a largely local enterprise. Law enforcement
today remains localized: the Department of Justice estimates
there are over 15,300 “general purpose” state and local law
enforcement agencies, of which more than 12,300 are municipal government police.282 Crime prevention strategies also
tend to be more efficient when made by local decision-making
authorities.283 And this lends some context to how courts may
address use of firearms for the provision of public safety.
Given the longstanding tradition of deference to local decision making with respect to who and how the city arms its
agents for public security, it is somewhat anomalous that when
municipal governments attempt to regulate public firearms,
some state legislatures have been aggressive to the point of
punitive. A supermajority of states preempt municipal regulation on guns,284 with some states going so far as to threaten
fines, removal from office, or personal civil liability for city leaders who “enact[ ] or enforc[e]” local regulations on firearms.285
Attention to the firearms rights of the city would restore some
of the local expertise and local governance that these kinds of
preemptive regulations disparage.
In sum, the argument we have supplied is fairly simple to
track: municipal corporations are not categorically prohibited
from asserting constitutional rights; the Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms is not purely personal, but has a
corporate, public component; the municipal corporation is an
institution that historically, traditionally, and functionally empowers and constrains the constitutional right of collective
282

Walker, supra note 270, at 619.
See John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local
Crime, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 673, 691 (1999) (“[N]othing about the local crime problem
suggests that centralization of power in federal law enforcement can be more
efficient than local organization of law enforcement.”); Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and PublicSpace Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1245 (1996) (noting need for flexibility); Wayne
A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J.
1409, 1419–20 (2001) (“That crime control should evolve in this self-consciously
localized manner should come as no surprise, given that the human consequences and articulated explanations of crime are largely local in nature, as are
police enforcement efforts.” (footnotes omitted)).
284
Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV.
1995, 1999 (2018) (“As of 2013 . . . forty-five states preempted local firearms
regulation.”).
285
Id. at 2002–03; see also Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American
Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1182 (2018) (discussing Arizona’s preemption statute
which permits investigation of local laws and withholding funding to the local
government if it remains out of compliance after thirty days) (citing ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 41-194.01 (2017)).
283
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arms bearing for self-defense. Hence municipal corporations
should have some claim to Second Amendment rights in a
post-Heller world.
III
THE CITY’S SECOND AMENDMENT
We have addressed two major objections to the city as a
bearer of Second Amendment rights. First is that cities cannot
assert constitutional rights, especially against the will of their
incorporating states. We explained how this notion rests on an
account of municipal corporations that bears little resemblance to the sociological reality of the modern American city, is
not uniformly applied as a matter of constitutional doctrine,
and is normatively undesirable. Second is that the right to
keep and bear arms is purely personal and cannot be understood in any collective or aggregate sense. We showed that the
Second Amendment retains, even post-Heller, a collective element designed to further public safety. We then showed how
the city is situated traditionally and functionally as an institution organized to administer that collective right.
In this last section, we sketch out the affirmative version of
the city’s Second Amendment. First, we supply a general
framework for how cities may assert rights to keep and bear
arms. Then we apply that framework to some of the specific
challenges of gun rights and policy we identified in the
introduction.
A. The Substantive Contours of the City’s Second
Amendment
1. Government Arms
As a general matter, our argument means courts should
recognize the unique arms-bearing interests of the city in litigation over the scope and protections of the Second Amendment.286 This interest is more specific than a general concern
with safety or an undifferentiated police power. It is an interest
in the city as an arms-bearing entity itself, and as an institution that manages collective arms bearing for public security.
The city’s interests in rights in this collective sense is not
unique to the bearing of arms. Borrowing from the First
286
Second Amendment issues, like First Amendment issues, and most other
constitutional rights have coverage issues and scope issues. The existing twopart framework for Second Amendment cases tends to follow these two lines of
analysis. For more on this, see BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 188, at 102–14.
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Amendment (as is frequently done in Second Amendment
cases287), free speech litigation has wrought a doctrine to address the government’s role as a speaker—the government
speech doctrine. This doctrine has two valences. One determines whether the speech should be attributed to the government.288 Expression that is determined to emanate from the
state is not subject to the typical requirement that the government must be content—and viewpoint—neutral with respect to
speech.289 Hence the federal government can express its views
that cigarette smoking is deadly even though that is clearly a
message with a strong critical perspective against some American citizens and industries.290 The second determines what
limitations, if any, the Constitution imposes on that speech.291
While the First Amendment’s Speech Clause may not limit the
state from expressing its opinions, other constitutional clauses
may. When the government’s speech takes the form of prayer
in public schools, for example, it may be barred as a violation of
the Establishment Clause, at least where it is regarded as coercive to nonbelievers.292

287
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008) (“Just as the First
Amendment protects modern forms of communications . . . the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms . . . .”)
(citation omitted); id. at 595 (“[W]e do not read the Second Amendment to protect
the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not
read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.”); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating
that “for guidance in evaluating Second Amendment challenges” the First Amendment right to speech “is the natural choice”).
288
E.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542–43 (2001) (speech
of lawyers working for state-funded Legal Services Corporation was constitutionally protected individual speech, not government speech); see generally HELEN
NORTON, THE GOVERNMENT’S SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION 27–67 (2019) (exploring
when speech of state actors and employees may be attributed to the government).
289
See Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245
(2015) (“When the government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause
from determining the content of what it says.”). The Court explained in Walker
that when the government speaks, it is regarded as a participant in, rather than a
regulator of, the marketplace of ideas. Id. at 2245–46.
290
See NORTON, supra note 288, at 28 (discussing this and other examples of
opinionated government expression).
291
E.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198–99 (1991) (holding that speech of
doctors in context of a government-funded health program was the speech of the
government, and thus not subject to scrutiny as viewpoint-discriminatory).
292
See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992) (holding that required
prayer at a school graduation ceremony was coercive in violation of the Establishment Clause where the school “compelled attendance and participation” in the
ceremony); see generally also NORTON, supra note 288, at 68–92 (discussing government speech in tension with the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses).
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Just as the local government can be situated as an actor
who speaks for First Amendment purposes,293 so may it be
situated as an actor who bears arms for Second Amendment
purposes. The question whether the government bears arms
should prove easier than determining when the government
speaks, largely because it is far more straightforward to determine when someone bears arms than when they are engaging
in constitutionally protected expression.294 The government
bears arms when it requires one of its agents to do so as part of
the agent’s official duties. So, a public-school security guard,
whether paid or a volunteer, who carries a gun when on duty
does so on behalf of the government.
A government arms doctrine is akin to the government
speech doctrine insofar as both need to identify when the state
is engaging in conduct in its own right. A government arms
doctrine would be different, and more expansive, than the government speech doctrine, however, in how it casts the state as
a rights bearer. While the Speech Clause does not constrain
the state when it speaks, neither does it offer constitutional
protection (conventionally understood) to government
speech.295 By contrast, the government arms doctrine as we
define it would supply municipal governments with both a
shield and a sword.296 The shield would be that just as the city
293
In making this claim, we recognize how government speech as an exception
to the First Amendment and government speech as a category of First Amendment
speech is still being worked out. See Blank, supra note 143, at 439; see also City
of El Cenizo v. State, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744, 776 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (local officials had
First Amendment right not to be gagged in their speech as government officials by
the state); Cty. of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1387, 1390
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (“A municipal corporation, like any corporation, is protected
under the First Amendment in the same manner as an individual.”), aff’d, 907
F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990). Richard Briffault suggests the El Cenizo decision shows
that “going beyond substantive preemption to penalize local expressive activity
may trigger judicially enforceable free speech concerns.” Briffault, supra note
284, at 2011. But see EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., 102 F.3d 869,
871 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The Executive Branch of the federal government does not
have rights under the first amendment . . . .”).
294
Just about any act has some expressive overtone, requiring courts to ask
hard questions about what counts as “speech.” Compare, e.g., S. Fla. Free
Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608, 609 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding nude
sunbathing not constitutionally protected speech), with, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565–66 (1991) (holding nude dancing constitutionally
protected speech).
295
See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (holding
that state action that can be viewed as government speech “is not subject to the
Free Speech Clause”).
296
In this way the government arms doctrine would go beyond the current
government speech doctrine, which tends to regard the speech of a city as a shield
against private suits, but only rarely as a sword against preemptive regulation by
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can privilege its own viewpoint when it speaks, a city can privilege its own arms and the arms of its agents over the arms of
others. The sword would be that the city, as a rights-bearing
entity, can assert its own Second Amendment rights in cases
where the state or federal government attempts to preempt its
function as the coordinator of collective arms bearing and as
the provider of public security with arms.297 That the city can
wield that right as a sword, however, does not say how sharp it
is. The strong version of the city’s Second Amendment would
negate contrary judgments by state or federal officials about
arms bearing, for instance, within the jurisdictional limits of
the city. A weaker form would act as a weight to the city’s side,
requiring federal or state authorities to offer additional justifications or proof why their policy choices about arms within
municipal boundaries should prevail over the choices of the
city.298
Introducing such a government arms doctrine would
change how judges think about the Second Amendment in
many cases involving cities and states. The typical framing in
these cases pits an individual who wishes to carry some
weapon against a state or local ordinance forbidding it. Conceiving of the city as a rights-bearing entity, and not just as a
regulator, changes the dynamic. No longer is the conflict just
an individual rights holder versus a government restraint; it is
now a conflict between two rights holders.
2. The City as Collective Security Decision Maker
The second and related implication of this analysis is that
the city, as the institution best situated to make decisions
about its collective armed security, would enjoy deference to its
choices. The analogy is to a private firm that merits some
deference with respect to how it manages its internal security
the state. But see Blank, supra note 143, at 373–75 (arguing for a more proactive
right of municipal government).
297
In this manner, our proposed model departs from an undifferentiated government speech model, which allows the city to speak, but does not clearly prevent the city from being gagged. See id. at 429 (“[O]nce we look more closely at
local entities, courts are much more ambivalent, even sympathetic, to the idea of
recognizing local entities as First Amendment speakers.”).
298
Either the strong or weak form could be related to Shawn Fields’s description of a subfederal anticommandeering doctrine. See Fields, supra note 5, at 487
(“[A] more nuanced subfederal anticommandeering principle may reside in the
Supreme Court’s treatment of localities as independent entities when the interpretation of a constitutional right requires local tailoring.”).
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operations.299 Thus far, few courts have expressly articulated
a corporate Second Amendment right;300 but, assuming such a
right, it seems that the private decision of which agent to empower to provide security is a core feature of this kind of corporate claim to Second Amendment rights.
If this corporate actor believes that the best security plan is
to designate two security guards armed with semiautomatic
pistols, then this decision should prevail over the individual
who wishes to carry an AR-15 onto corporate property. Indeed,
the security guards, exercising the Second Amendment rights
of the private company, would have a coordinate authority to
disarm such a person, on the ground that the rifle wielding
individual is not an authorized agent.301 Private Second
Amendment rights would thus contain both a positive component (the right to have two armed security guards on site) and a
negative one (the right not to have others interfere with this
plan).302
By the same token, at least in public places or areas controlled by the city, in the strong version of this model, the city’s
decisions about collective security should prevail over assertions of Second Amendment rights to the contrary. Consider,
for example, the Houston Public Library. An individual who
wanted to carry a gun into the library could argue that she was
entitled to do so, due to Texas’s relaxed gun laws, which allow
concealed carry holders to carry their weapons into many public buildings, including libraries.303 On our theory, though,
299
Cf. Second Amendment Arms v. City of Chicago, 135 F. Supp. 3d 743, 761
(N.D. Ill. 2015) (assuming private firearm businesses can claim Second Amendment rights).
300
But see id. (“Defendants have not presented the Court with any persuasive
authority as to why Second Amendment protections should not extend to
businesses.”).
301
Cf. United States v. Richards, 937 F.2d 1287, 1292 (7th Cir. 1991) (disarming others is a manifestation of self-defense); State v. Smith, 150 S.E.2d 194, 198
(N.C. 1966) (“[I]f one disarms another in self-defense with no intent to steal his
weapon, he is not guilty of robbery.”); Moran v. Martinson, 146 N.W. 841, 842
(Iowa 1914) (judging instructions correct to state that man had right to disarm
woman with revolver in self-defense).
302
Note that this justification is different than just a general power to exclude
under property law. See GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1264
(11th Cir. 2012) (discussing Second Amendment law written on a “background” of
common law that permits individuals to exclude others from their property). The
implication is that “parking lot” laws and other kinds of “forced entry” regulations
impact the Second Amendment rights of corporate entities. See Miller, supra note
12, at 907.
303
FAQ: Handguns in Texas Libraries, TEX. ST. LIBR. & ARCHIVES COMMISSION,
https://www.tsl.texas.gov/ld/pubs/opencarry.html [https://perma.cc/FKT5EWXY] (last visited Nov. 15, 2020).
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Houston is the constitutionally appropriate decision maker on
the collective security of the library and its patrons. So, if the
city asserted that it wanted only its armed guards to carry
weapons in the library, we argue that that assertion should
prevail over individuals’ claims to the contrary, whether rooted
in state law or the federal Constitution.304
3. Limits
Situating the city as a bearer of collective firearm rights
introduces a number of difficult issues into the conversation
about the Second Amendment. Perhaps the hardest of these is
how to negotiate the conflicts between the city’s collective right
to promote safety, its decisional priority on that issue, and
individual rights, including personal rights to bear arms for
self-defense.
When these come into conflict, the answer cannot simply
be that the city’s prerogative as the final decision maker on
collective security with guns prevails over all individual rights.
For example, we do not think a Second Amendment right of a
city means that it can discriminate on the basis of race or
gender when it licenses persons to carry firearms. Nor do we
think that a city’s Second Amendment interest in public security sweeps away all the limits of Fourth Amendment excessive
force or reasonable search jurisprudence.
More difficult is how to think about how the city’s Second
Amendment claims interact with an individual right to keep
and bear arms for personal self-defense. One way to mediate
this conflict is through the division of physical space. On the
one hand, the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense has
always been at its apogee in the home.305 A city’s Second
Amendment choices do not necessarily prevail when it comes
to regulations concerning firearms there.306 Another is the notion of “sensitive places” identified in the Heller opinion.307
There could be a sliding scale of priority of municipal interest in
protecting “sensitive places.” They may include schools and
304
There may be other constitutional issues as well, such as free speech rights
and the institutional posture of the library as a site of free expression, but that is a
matter of other scholarship. See Darrell A. H. Miller, Constitutional Conflict and
Sensitive Places, 28 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 459, 485 (2019).
305
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (describing the
home as “where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute”).
306
See, e.g., Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound
Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1299–1301 (2009) (discussing
restrictions that could apply to the Second Amendment).
307
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
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government buildings, but also public property where the city’s
duty and right to provide collective security, such as streets or
parks, are at its greatest. Again, the instinct is the city has
more than just a “proprietary” interest in those spaces; it has
an arms for self-defense interest in these places as well. Hybrid
public/private spaces, such as government-funded entities like
city-run day care, medical clinics, or government housing present harder cases.
Nor do we think the city’s right to determine its own collective security necessarily allows municipalities to coerce individuals into firearm ownership or to carry firearms against their
will. One might imagine that a city, particularly a sparsely
populated one where police response was necessarily limited,
might argue that an armed citizenry would prevent crime by
enabling citizens to supplement public order with their own
self-defensive conduct.308 This is not as fanciful an example as
it may seem. At the dawn of the American republic, many cities
required certain categories of residents to own guns (subject,
though, to strict regulations in terms of use and storage).309
And the city of Kennesaw, Georgia, passed an ordinance requiring that “every head of household residing in the city limits
is required to maintain a firearm.”310 Here too, the individual
right to bear arms (or more accurately, the right not to bear
arms311) would overbear any municipal right rooted in the Second Amendment. In the same sense that we argue the Second
Amendment gives cities the prerogative to make public decisions about collective security, so would it give individuals the
right to make private decisions about their own individual
safety, and if they felt that carrying a firearm on their person or
having one in their home was not in their interest, the city’s
concern for public safety cannot countermand that choice.

308
One county in financial distress essentially told all its residents to arm
themselves. Associated Press, “Lock Your Doors, Load Your Gun,” Kentucky Sheriff Warns in Stopping Law Enforcement, ABC15 (Feb. 12, 2019, 6:32 PM), https://
www.abc15.com/national/lock-your-doors-load-your-gun-kentucky-sheriffwarns-in-stopping-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/N2T5-BDHB].
309
E.g., An Act for Regulating of the Militia, ch. 3, §§ 1, 5, 1694 Mass. Acts
128; An Act for the Regulating, Training and Arraying of the Militia, ch. 21, § 11,
1778 N.J. Laws 45.
310
Omar Jimenez, In This American Town, Guns Are Required by Law, CNN
(Mar. 7, 2018 2:22 PM) (internal quotation marks omitted), https://
www.cnn.com/2018/03/06/us/kennesaw-georgia-gun-ownership/index.html
[https://perma.cc/7GBL-AUDX].
311
See Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1,
6 (2012).
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Finally, the city could not simply invoke the Second
Amendment any time that it sought to regulate firearms, and
then claim that its status as the ultimate decision maker on
these issues concluded the matter. Rather, the city’s right to
keep and bear arms would apply only where it makes plausible,
good faith attempts to organize collective security. Just as with
other constitutional doctrines, courts could review city claims
to bear arms under some degree of scrutiny.312 At the very
least, if the city’s defense of some firearm-related action or
regulation under the Second Amendment was not reasonably
related to its interest in advancing public safety, its assertion of
the right would fail.
B. The Theory in Practice
1. Concealed Carry Licensing
An obvious application of the government arms doctrine
would be in the area of concealed carry licensing. Today, no
state in the union categorically prohibits a person from ever
carrying a firearm out of their homes. Instead, the major unresolved issue in Second Amendment jurisprudence is the constitutionality of “shall-issue” versus “may-issue” regimes for
carrying firearms. Fifteen states require no license to carry a
firearm at all; approximately thirteen “shall-issue” states require a license, but do not permit any discretion on the part of
the licensing official if the applicant meets certain minimum
requirements (typically related to firearm prohibitors such as a
felony conviction); another fourteen “shall issue” states provide
limited discretion; and eight states have “may issue” licensing
laws that require the applicant to demonstrate good cause.313
Some states require training on when and how to use firearms;
half of the states don’t require any training at all.314
Treating the city as a Second Amendment rights bearer
would transform the way law regards regulation of concealed
carry. A person carrying a firearm publicly, even if not using it,
is not acting on only behalf of himself alone but is carrying for
312
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791–803 (1989) (outlining
a test for the constitutionality of time, place, or manner speech regulations); see
also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87–89 (1949) (regulating sound trucks based
on reasonable time, place, and manner regulation on speech).
313
See Concealed Carry, G IFFORDS L. CTR. (Nov. 8, 2019), https://
lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/concealed-carry/
[https://perma.cc/8KKN-573H].
314
Mascia, supra note 9 (“Just 24 states and the District of Columbia include
mandatory range time as part of their permitting process, while the remaining 26
have no such requirement in place.”).
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the protection of himself and others. Individual concealed
carry significantly affects collective security, so that the city
clearly has an interest in who is providing this public benefit.
The strongest version of a government arms claims would
mean the city could refuse to permit any person to publicly
carry firearms except for the city’s own designated agents. This
may seem draconian, but it is similar conceptually to a corporation banning weapons possession in its headquarters on the
theory that it alone can determine the deployment of arms in
the interest of its internal security. A middle position may
allow individuals to carry weapons, but not of the same lethality as those of the designated security agents. This outcome
would allow individuals some ability to engage in self-defense
and defense of others but would preclude local authorities from
being outgunned as they were during the 2017 Charlottesville
riot.315 These are only two ways to mediate between the city’s
and individuals’ gun rights. Regardless of how this line is
drawn, the city should not be constitutionally cut out of the
process of deciding who will be its guardians, how those guardians will be trained, and what weapons they will use to produce
this public good.316
2. Police Officers Versus the City
Several members of the Seattle Police Department recently
sued the City of Seattle on the theory that the city’s revised use
of force policy violated their individual Second Amendment
rights.317 The plaintiffs argued that the policy, which prevented them from using their firearms unless such use was
“objectively reasonable,” unconstitutionally constrained their
315
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Hurt and Angry, Charlottesville Tries to Regroup from
Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/
us/charlottesville-protests-white-nationalists.html [https://perma.cc/6R4AHH7Q]. Governor McAuliffe observed that the protestors “had better equipment
than [s]tate [p]olice had.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
316
Cf. Concealed Carry State by State, GIFFORDS L. CTR. (Nov. 8. 2019), https:/
/lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/state-law/50-state-summaries/concealedcarry-state-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/8KKN-573H] (noting that until December 1, 2015, Michigan’s handgun permitting scheme required authorities to notify
any “city, village, or township that has a police department . . . to determine if it
has any information relevant to the applicant’s eligibility under state law to receive a license to carry a concealed handgun.”).
317
See Olivia Beavers, Appeals Court Rules Against Seattle Cops Who Sued
Over Use of Force Policy, HILL (Sept. 19, 2017, 4:11 PM), https://thehill.com/
blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/351401-appeals-court-rules-against-seattlecops-who-sued-over-use-of [https://perma.cc/95XK-D4GN].
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ability to use their firearms for self-defense.318 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the claim on the
theory that the use of force policy survived intermediate scrutiny and did not violate the officers’ Second Amendment
rights.319
Missing from this opinion was any notion that Seattle also
had Second Amendment interests that should enter into the
analysis.320 Our framework would invite those considerations,
and would likely yield a strikingly different analytical approach, albeit one that ultimately reached the same outcome.
Here, the police were not seeking to use force on their own
behalf, but rather in their roles as agents and employees of
Seattle. So just as law regards government employees who
issue statements in the scope of their employment as engaging
in government, rather than individual, speech,321 here the police should be regarded as bearing arms on behalf of the Seattle. This move alone would change the posture of the case.
Instead of engaging in an analysis of whether the use of force
rules restricted the police officers’ individual Second Amendment rights, the government arms doctrine would highlight
that the police’s use of arms in their work as peace officers does
not constitute an exercise of individual rights in the first instance.322 So because the plaintiffs would not bear any Second
Amendment rights under a government-arms approach, the
court’s substantive analysis would be unnecessary.
3. Teachers with Guns
The school shootings that have afflicted America in recent
years323 have divided policy makers. One reaction is to have
318
Mahoney v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
319
Id. at 883.
320
The lower court adopted what may be thought of as a kind of government
arms theory at step one of the Second Amendment analysis, stating the claim did
not even raise a Second Amendment question because the use of force regulation
“represents an effort by an employer, the Seattle Police Department, to regulate
the use not only of (employer-issued) weapons but of the force its employees are
specially sanctioned to wield on behalf of the city government.” Mahoney v. Holder,
62 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1222 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (emphasis added), aff’d sub nom.
Mahoney v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2017).
321
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (“We hold that when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are
not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”).
322
See Mahoney v. Holder, 62 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1222 (W.D. Wash. 2014).
323
See Elizabeth Wolfe & Christina Walker, In 46 Weeks This Year, There Have
Been 45 School Shootings, CNN (Nov. 19, 2019, 4:13 AM), https://www.cnn.com/
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more guns in schools, including arming teachers.324 The other
is to limit guns in schools, including preventing teachers from
bringing arms into the classroom. Madison County, Ohio epitomizes the first response; in April of 2018 the school board
voted overwhelmingly to arm teachers.325 The State of New
York epitomizes the second; in July 2019, Governor Andrew
Cuomo signed legislation barring local school districts from
arming teachers.326 The guns in school issue raises two possible iterations of the city’s Second Amendment.327
First, consider a municipal school district that passed an
ordinance similar to the New York state law, preventing individual teachers from bearing arms within public schools because
it believes that this will make schools safer. This example is
similar to the previous one: A municipal entity is dictating how
its employees may bear arms in an attempt to enhance internal
security. The example is different, though, in other respects. A
municipal police department is typically the primary method by
which a city organizes arms bearing for internal security.
School boards have not traditionally served that function,
though schools are another public place where security is especially desirable. Bearing arms on behalf of the city and in the
city’s interest is a core function of police; it is not (at least has
not historically been) a core duty of teachers in the scope of
their employment. Finally, the municipal entity here is different: in the Seattle case the city itself we imagine asserting a
Second Amendment right; here, it is a school district.
For all those reasons, this is a harder case. As in Mahoney,
the teachers whose firearm use is regulated are municipal employees, and the regulation affects them only in the scope of
their employment. One could thus argue that the government
arms doctrine would work similarly. This is an instance in
2019/11/15/us/2019-us-school-shootings-trnd/index.html#:~:text=in%2046
%20weeks%20this%20year%2C%20there%20have%20been%2045%20school
%20shootings&text=on%20college%20and%20university%20campuses,serving
%20Kindergarten%20through%2012th%20grade [https://perma.cc/9HQGE7QD].
324
Matt Richmond, With No National Standards, Policies for Arming Teachers
Are Often Left to Local School Districts, NPR (Apr. 2, 2019), https://wamu.org/
story/19/04/02/with-no-national-standards-policies-for-arming-teachers-areoften-left-to-local-school-districts/ [https://perma.cc/N3C4-8DDX].
325
Breaking News Staff, Madison Local Schools Board Votes to Allow Arming of
Teachers, Staff, WHIO TV7 (Apr. 25, 2018, 11:19 AM), https://www.whio.com/
news/local/madison-local-schools-board-votes-allow-arming-teachers-staff/
jBDB39Y97Ml3jrGcaxvTEN/ [https://perma.cc/T6EK-HUPD].
326
Gold, supra note 7.
327
The issue of arming teachers also raises significant First Amendment issues which we do not address here. See Miller, supra note 304, at 470–72.
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which a municipality is acting to advance the cause of its citizens’ safety, which would amount to a core exercise of the city’s
Second Amendment as we have outlined it. So, one could simply assert that the teachers have no individual right to keep
and bear arms in this case; their arms-bearing on-the-job conduct is subsumed by and an extension of the municipality’s
Second Amendment rights. On the other hand, one could argue that schoolteachers are not police, and since they are not
traditionally charged with peacekeeping functions, the presumption of regulating in a constitutionally empowered space
is not as strong.
This is likely a distinction without a difference. For one
thing, the aim of the school district’s policy is directly related to
safety and in particular to reduce firearm-related violence.
Moreover, the Court highlighted in Heller that in certain “sensitive places”—including “schools and government buildings”—
individual Second Amendment rights needed to give way to
states’ and cities’ interest in peacekeeping and safety.328 Nor
should it matter that the state actor here is a school district
rather than the city itself; the fact that the district has delegated responsibility over education matters (including safety)
does not change the interests at play or the constitutionalrights calculus. On the contrary, the Court’s shadow doctrine
respecting rights seems to extend to other kinds of municipal
subdivisions as well as cities. So long as the subdivision has a
separate corporate identity, whether it is a general municipal
government or a special purpose government should not
matter.
Consider a second valence of this issue: What if a state
passed a law like New York’s that prevented school districts
from arming teachers and a gun-friendly county argued that
the state law infringed its Second Amendment rights? Here,
the problem is not possible tension between city and individual
rights to keep and bear arms, but rather the conflict between
firearm decision making between states and municipalities,
and how the Second Amendment mediates such conflicts.
Here, the county could resist the state law on a pair of
theories. One theory would be that the county has authority to
decide for itself the best method of securing schools. While the
above discussion suggests that local assertions of authority
over firearm regulation in schools predominates over the personal firearm interests of municipal employees, the same may
328

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
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not be true for state laws regulating municipal employees. Cities and counties could argue that they have longstanding historical authority to regulate public safety, and that in their
discretion they prefer to have individual teachers bear arms in
school because they regard it as a safety-enhancing practice.
We do not think a collective Second Amendment justification for this kind of decision necessarily allows the local government to immunize armed teachers from liability for
constitutional torts, any more than self-defense claims by police officers immunize them from Fourth Amendment suits.329
Nor do we think this analysis relieves the local government of
the constitutional obligation to adequately train armed teachers on the limits of lethal force. The archetypical “failure to
train case” after all, is to empower government agents to employ deadly weapons and not to train them on their use.330
However, even with these limitations, the implication of a local
government’s authority to enforce its own constitutional rights
to keep and bear arms—even in the face of contrary state priorities—is that local governments can experiment with firearm
deregulation as much as regulation.
4. Second Amendment Sanctuaries
Next, consider Second Amendment sanctuaries. These are
counties and cities that have passed legislative resolutions declaring that they will not enforce certain laws that they deem
violative of the right to keep and bear arms.331 The resolutions
protest a variety of measures ranging from background checks
to laws enabling authorities to temporarily take weapons from
dangerous or unstable persons. The effect of these declarations is hard to monitor. To the extent that city officials implement the resolutions, that means only that they refuse to
enforce the law—a negative proposition that can be difficult to
identify or quantify. Perhaps notably, as of yet there has not
329
Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[W]hatever the
circumstances prompting law enforcement officers to use force, whether it be selfdefense, defense of another or resistance to arrest, where, as here, a fourth
amendment violation is alleged, the inquiry remains whether the force applied
was reasonable.”); Richardson v. McGriff, 762 A.2d 48, 90 (Md. 2000) (Harrell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Unlike the purely objective standard
[for use of force] required by [the Fourth Amendment] the self-defense doctrine
contains both subjective and objective elements.”).
330
See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 396 (1989).
331
See Kelly Mena, Virginia Counties Move to Become ‘Second Amendment
Sanctuaries’, CNN (Dec. 6, 2019, 6:14 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/06/
politics/virginia-counties-second-amendment/index.html [https://perma.cc/
FF2H-X9WX].
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been an incident where a citizen sought enforcement of gun
regulation and found local officials to be actively noncompliant.
Imagine, though, that the failure of a municipal official to
take action led to litigation. For example: California requires
firearm dealers to perform background checks before issuing
weapons to purchasers. The City of Needles is a California
desert town just west of the Arizona border that recently declared itself a Second Amendment sanctuary.332 Suppose that
firearms dealers in Needles began issuing weapons without
performing background checks, and that city officials did not
enforce this violation of state law. If the State of California sued
the City of Needles for an injunction requiring them to enforce
the background-check law, could Needles invoke the Second
Amendment to resist the injunction?
The answer to this question may depend on how courts
conceptualized Needles’ status as a constitutional actor. If it
argued that it was declining to enforce the state law because it
believed that the law violated its residents’ rights to keep and
bear arms, it would not raise the question whether the city qua
city bore those rights because it would be acting on behalf of
residents in some derivative fashion. Asserting itself as an aggregation of its residents’ individual Second Amendment liberties avoids the hard question whether the city itself bears those
rights, but here too it runs headlong into other objections. If
Needles prevailed on the argument that the state law violated
the individual right to keep and bear arms, that would generate
a general holding that would invalidate the law statewide.
Some scholars have argued that the breadth of such an outcome would be concerning because, as in this example, a minority of California’s 482 cities that passed a Second
Amendment sanctuary resolution would replace and restrain
the judgment of the remaining localities. David Barron, for
example, has argued against city policymaking that binds all
other localities to follow the same course because it removes
the decision-making discretion of the other cities.333
Alternatively, Needles could defend nonenforcement of the
background-check law on the theory that the California law
332

Glionna, supra note 5.
David J. Barron, supra note 139, at 2222 (“When a city’s constitutional
claim . . . would not expand local policymaking discretion but instead bind every
locality to follow a single course, then its interpretive independence from the state
should be, as Justice Jackson wrote in a related context, ‘at its lowest ebb.’ . . .
Cities have no sufficient interest in pressing these constitutional claims . . . and
thus generally should be barred from doing so.”).
333
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violates the city’s own Second Amendment rights. Here, the
claim would presume that the city—apart from its aggregated
members—may assert such rights and would invoke the collective component of the right to keep and bear arms. One aspect
of this assertion is the institutional point that cities, not states,
should serve as the primary lawmakers with respect to firearm
policy because of their historic authority over and expertise in
managing public safety.334 That said, though, Needles would
have to prove that their nonenforcement of the law advances its
public safety decisions in some meaningful way. Here, the substantive argument is much harder to make than, say, in the
case of guns in schools where there is at least a colorable
argument that the regulation enhances school safety. What
public-safety objective would noncompliance with background
checks further? Needles could argue, for example, that its underfunded police department would benefit from having citizens engaging in self-defense and defense of others, so that
having guns more freely circulating in the community would
further public safety. But this argument seems to recommend
rather than detract from the benefits of background checks. If
a city wants to recruit private citizens into the service of internal security, it will presumably want and need to know that the
citizens who are armed are responsible and competent gun
owners and screen out dangerous and unstable individuals.
This example illustrates that conceptualizing the right to keep
and bear arms as one borne by cities would not necessarily give
cities carte blanche to turn themselves into libertarian gunregulation-free zones but would be disciplined by the principles
that animate the collective component of the Second Amendment in the first instance.
5. The Law Enforcement Officer Safety Act
Thus far we have cabined our analysis to instances where
state weapons regulations come into conflict with city policymaking. Before concluding, though, we touch briefly on how
the city’s Second Amendment rights would fare when they
come into conflict with federal law. A 2004 law, the Law Enforcement Officer Safety Act335 (LEOSA) furnishes an opportunity to explore this issue. LEOSA allows qualified current law
334
See Fields, supra note 5, at 488 (“While a statewide gun-control measure
might not violate the Second Amendment per se, its application to a particular
municipality might do so because it fails to be sufficiently tailored to the locality’s
needs.”).
335
18 U.S.C. § 926C (2018).
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and retired law enforcement officers to carry concealed firearms in any jurisdiction of the United States, regardless of
state or local laws.
Our claim is that the Second Amendment confers on cities
the right to regulate their own collective security. While LEOSA
does not restrict a city’s right to hire peace officers or make
certain firearms available to citizens, it does dilute a city’s ability to select the particular arms bearers that will promote its
collective security. To be sure, a city may welcome LEOSA as a
means of providing additional trained law enforcement officers
within its boundaries to supplement its collective security. But
to the extent that a city may not want individuals other than its
selected police force responsible for its security, LEOSA overrides cities’ freedom to make this choice. LEOSA’s derogation
of cities’ Second Amendment prerogatives is particularly pronounced because the law effectively requires cities to accept
the decisions of other jurisdictions about who is allowed to bear
arms in its jurisdiction regardless of the city’s own standards
or judgment with respect to who counts as a qualified law
enforcement officer. To the extent that LEOSA forces cities
(and states) to accept the federal government’s judgment about
who is qualified to bear arms within their jurisdiction, the law
may also run afoul of the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering principle.336
Our argument that a federal law could fail to pass constitutional muster as against a city’s policy to the contrary will seem
surprising at first glance. After all, the Supremacy Clause
guarantees that federal laws prevail over conflicting state regulations, and Courts have extended the reach of the Clause to
local laws as well. Yet if we are to take the city’s Second
Amendment seriously, rooted as it is in the empirical claim that
cities are best situated to determine the shape of their internal
security policies, then LEOSA has to give way to the city’s constitutional right.
CONCLUSION
How courts address the constitutional rights of private corporations and the constitutional rights of municipal corporations diverged long ago. The possibility that this divergence will
continue with regard to one of the most consequential set of
questions—who should be empowered by constitutional right
336
See Burban v. City of Neptune Beach, 920 F.3d 1274, 1281–82 (11th Cir.
2019) (rejecting a construction of LEOSA that would “raise serious anticommandeering concerns”).
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to threaten and deploy lethal force—should cause us to rethink
the entire manner in which we conceive of local governments
and their place in our constitutional structure.
This Article is an effort to begin that discussion. The municipal corporation is an institution that for historical and
functional reasons has managed the collective aspects of the
Second Amendment. And yet, it suffers from the lack of any
consistent or reasoned placement within our constitutional order. In a post-Heller era, when the militia has been weakened,
if not entirely eliminated, from our right to keep and bear arms
jurisprudence, we should think more deliberately about what
public institutions facilitate and constrain this most public of
issues. The city is a good place to start.

